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ABSTRACT—“Inequitable conduct” is a patent law doctrine that renders a
patent unenforceable when the patentee is found to have acted improperly
before the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office. It is widely reviled and
frequently criticized for being draconian: the Federal Circuit has famously
called the doctrine an “absolute plague” that terrorizes patent owners.
Responding to the concern about overdeterrence, the Federal Circuit has
repeatedly narrowed the doctrine.
This Article takes a different perspective. The conventional wisdom is
correct enough in arguing that the inequitable conduct doctrine sometimes
produces overdeterrence. What has been overlooked, however, is the fact
that the doctrine also produces underdeterrence. Specifically, as this Article
will demonstrate, the unenforceability penalty creates too much deterrence
against minor errors, but it also produces inadequate deterrence against the
most serious patentee frauds. In this way, the doctrine is upside down.
Once we understand that there is an underdeterrence problem, it
quickly becomes evident that conventional proposals to narrow liability
(which the Federal Circuit has generally adopted) are misguided.
Narrowing the inequitable conduct doctrine can mitigate the overdeterrence
problem, but only at the price of exacerbating the underdeterrence problem.
At the same time, the Article will demonstrate that expanding liability, as
some have argued, is no better: it simply exacerbates the overdeterrence
problem. Rather than focus on the liability standard, the proper solution is
to reform the penalty in a way that addresses both the over- and
underdeterrence effects.
AUTHOR—Assistant Professor of Law, George Mason University School
of Law. Thanks to Dennis Crouch, Harry First, Herbert Hovenkamp, Paul
Janicke, Julia Ju, Jay Kesan, Mark Lemley, Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Jason
Rantanen, David Schwartz, Sarah Tran, and participants at the Intellectual
Property Scholars Conference, the Works in Progress IP Colloquium, and
the IMPRS/ETH Zurich Workshop on the Law and Economics of IP and
Competition Law for comments and suggestions.

1243

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................... 1244
I.

II.

UPSIDE-DOWN DETERRENCE FOR PATENTEES ..................................................... 1247
A.

Invalidity Versus Unenforceability ............................................................ 1248

B.

The Problem of Underdeterrence .............................................................. 1251

C.

The Problem of Overdeterrence................................................................. 1254

D.

A Model of the Over- and Underdeterrence Effects ................................... 1255

E.

Considering Objections to the Model ........................................................ 1257

F.

The Difference from the Conventional Wisdom ......................................... 1259

UPSIDE-DOWN INCENTIVES FOR ACCUSED INFRINGERS ....................................... 1261
A.

The Selection of Defenses in Litigation...................................................... 1262

B.

The Effect on Judicial Perceptions ............................................................ 1265

C.

Matching Theory to Empirics: The Universal Unpopularity of
Inequitable Conduct................................................................................... 1267

III. THE EFFECT OF ADJUSTING LIABILITY STANDARDS ............................................. 1275
A.

The Debate over Liability Standards ......................................................... 1275

B.

A Model of Unenforceability with Liability Thresholds ............................. 1277

C.

Expanding the Model with Probabilistic Liability ..................................... 1280

IV. A PROPOSED SOLUTION: ADJUSTING REMEDIES .................................................. 1283
A.

Generalizing the Problem: The Paradox of Fraud .................................... 1283

B.

Punitive Fines as a Solution ...................................................................... 1286

C.

Addressing Objections to the Proposal ...................................................... 1292

CONCLUSION .............................................................................................................. 1303

INTRODUCTION
“Inequitable conduct” is a patent law doctrine designed to ensure that
patent applicants are honest in their dealings with the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office (PTO). 1 The doctrine achieves this by rendering a
dishonestly obtained patent unenforceable.2 Although this outcome might
seem quite unobjectionable to an outsider, the doctrine in fact attracts more
passionate loathing, and stronger criticism, than any other doctrine in
patent law. As a striking example, the Federal Circuit calls the inequitable
conduct doctrine an “absolute plague” that terrorizes patent owners,3 and

1

See ROBERT PATRICK MERGES & JOHN FITZGERALD DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND POLICY: CASES
1111 (5th ed. 2011) (inequitable conduct “harnesses the private interests of litigants in
an effort to police the integrity of the patent system”).
2
See id.
3
Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Dayco Corp., 849 F.2d 1418, 1422 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
AND MATERIALS
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calls the unenforceability penalty an “atomic bomb.”4 Other members of
the patent community regularly voice similar sentiments—in government,5
in the academy, 6 and among practitioners. 7 The consensus is that the
unenforceability penalty is always harsh and draconian—akin to a fixed,
mandatory $1 million fine. Responding to this view, courts have repeatedly
narrowed the inequitable conduct doctrine to ensure that the million-dollar fine
is applied only to million-dollar crimes.8 Calls for even more narrowing—
or for outright abolition—are common.9
This Article argues that the conventional wisdom misunderstands the
effect of the unenforceability remedy, and this misunderstanding leads to
the wrong solutions. In truth, the unenforceability remedy is not analogous
to a flat $1 million fine that is severe in all cases. Rather, the effect of the
unenforceability remedy is variable.10 If the patent is valid under the true
state of facts, then rendering the patent unenforceable is a very severe
punishment. But if the patent is already invalid for independent reasons,
then holding an invalid patent unenforceable creates no punishment or
deterrence against dishonesty.
The fact that the severity of the unenforceability penalty varies with
the validity of the patent has been largely overlooked in the existing
literature and case law,11 and it produces three implications. The first is that
patentees have upside-down incentives to engage in dishonest conduct. As I
4

Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1288 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (en banc)
(quoting Aventis Pharma S.A. v. Amphastar Pharm., Inc., 525 F.3d 1334, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (Rader,
J., dissenting)).
5
See, e.g., Orrin G. Hatch, Keynote Address, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 513, 515–16 (2010)
(criticizing the inequitable conduct defense).
6
See, e.g., Christopher A. Cotropia, Modernizing Patent Law’s Inequitable Conduct Doctrine,
24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 723, 762–70 (2009) (arguing that inequitable conduct doctrine results in
overdisclosure); Christian E. Mammen, Controlling the “Plague”: Reforming the Doctrine of
Inequitable Conduct, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1329, 1390–94 (2009).
7
See, e.g., John F. Lynch, An Argument for Eliminating the Defense of Patent Unenforceability
Based on Inequitable Conduct, 16 AIPLA Q.J. 7 (1988) (arguing for abolition).
8
See, e.g., Star Scientific, Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 537 F.3d 1357, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2008)
(arguing for a high burden of proof because “the penalty . . . is so severe”); Aventis Pharma, 525 F.3d at
1349 (Rader, J., dissenting) (arguing that inequitable conduct should be limited to “only the most
extreme cases of fraud and deception”).
9
See, e.g., Cotropia, supra note 6, at 774–78 (arguing for narrowing the doctrine); Mammen, supra
note 6 (same); see also Lynch, supra note 7 (arguing for elimination of inequitable conduct as a defense
to patent enforcement).
10
To be clear, I am referring here only to the magnitude of the punishment, without regard to
culpability. Thus, a million-dollar fine is “severe” even when it is applied to a million-dollar crime. I
will consider culpability next.
11
As I discuss in Part III, shades of this point are sometimes made in judicial opinions, especially
the dissent in Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1305–06 (Fed. Cir. 2011)
(en banc) (Bryson, J., dissenting). But the judges making this point clearly do not appreciate its full
implications because their proposed solution—to expand liability—actually makes the problem even
worse.
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shall demonstrate in Part I, the unenforceability remedy creates no
deterrence precisely for the biggest lies, while it creates very strong
deterrence against the smallest errors. An example will illustrate this
dynamic: the most culpable type of patentee misconduct is perhaps
shredding unfavorable test results proving that the patentee’s claimed
invention does not work. But in order to prove an inequitable conduct
charge, someone must first find the shredded documents and reassemble
their contents, and once this is done the patent will be invalidated—because
the invention does not work, not because of the shredding of documents.
There is thus no punishment levied for the document shredding, and a
patentee who receives unfavorable test results thus has every incentive to
shred them. To generalize from the example, the problem with inequitable
conduct doctrine is that the more damaging the information being
concealed, the more likely the patent will be found invalid once the truth is
exposed; but the unenforceability penalty can only be applied after the
concealment is discovered and the truth exposed, so it is most likely to be
superfluous precisely in the cases of the biggest lies. Punishment and
deterrence therefore vary inversely with culpability.
Although the insight is simple, this portrait of inequitable conduct as
upside down differs from the common understanding of the literature.
Existing scholarship overwhelmingly argues that inequitable conduct
produces overdeterrence and should be narrowed across the board.12 A few
isolated voices argue that inequitable conduct produces underdeterrence
and should be expanded across the board.13 My argument is that inequitable
conduct is not uniform in its effect, that it produces both over- and
underdeterrence at the same time, and that a solution should be tailored for
both effects.
The second implication is that the variability of the penalty produces
upside-down incentives for accused infringers in litigation. As I shall
demonstrate in Part II, the more serious the misconduct by the patentee, the
less likely it is that an accused infringer will choose to litigate an
inequitable conduct claim to expose that misconduct. This produces an
important selection effect. Over time, courts will see many claims of
inequitable conduct made over trivial mistakes, but they will almost never
see any claim involving serious misconduct. 14 This “availability bias”
means that judges will start to believe that truly serious patentee

12

See, e.g., Cotropia, supra note 6, at 762–70, 774–78; Mammen, supra note 6; Melissa Feeney
Wasserman, Limiting the Inequitable Conduct Defense, 13 VA. J.L. & TECH. 1, 22–23 (2008).
13
See David McGowan, Inequitable Conduct, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 945, 975–77 (2010) (arguing
for loosening the intent and pleading requirements).
14
See, e.g., Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Dayco Corp., 849 F.2d 1418, 1422 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (stating
that accusations of inequitable conduct are “an absolute plague” because accused infringers succeed in
only “a small percentage of the cases”).
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misconduct almost never occurs.15 The result is that the same judges will
narrow inequitable conduct doctrine, which is precisely what has happened
in real life.16 My point is that this belief in patentee honesty, which has
driven much doctrinal change, is based on an illusion.
The third implication is that reform should focus more on adjusting the
remedy for inequitable conduct and less on the standard for attaching
liability. One effect of the conceptualization of the unenforceability remedy
as unchanging and severe—akin to a flat $1 million fine—is that the debate
focuses on the standard for liability. Those who believe that inequitable
conduct produces overdeterrence focus on raising the burden of proof and
narrowing liability. 17 The minority who believe that inequitable conduct
produces underdeterrence focus on lowering the burden of proof and
expanding liability.18 My argument in Part III is that neither type of reform
is likely to work because they both fail to consider the upside-down nature
of the unenforceability remedy. As discussed above and elaborated in Part
I, the problem with inequitable conduct is that the penalty is too low in
highly culpable cases but is too high in trivial cases. Narrowing liability
(the dominant position) does ensure that the trivial cases are not penalized,
but it does nothing to fix the underdeterrence problem for high-culpability
cases, and so too much dishonesty will occur before the PTO. Expanding
liability (the conventional minority position) without fixing the penalty
structure is even worse: it means that trivial cases will now be
overpenalized, but it does nothing to fix the underdeterrence problem in
high-culpability cases because the penalty there will still be too low.
Part IV outlines my proposed solution, which is to abolish the
unenforceability remedy and replace it with a more direct penalty like a
monetary fine that can be tailored to the degree of culpability. This Part
then addresses some potential objections. A conclusion follows.
I. UPSIDE-DOWN DETERRENCE FOR PATENTEES
The purpose of this Part is to demonstrate that the unenforceability
remedy produces upside-down incentives for patentees. As sections B
through D will show, the more culpable the misconduct by the patentee, the
less deterrence the unenforceability remedy will provide. The key factor
15

See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Availability: A Heuristic for Judging Frequency and
Probability, 5 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 207 (1973).
16
See Lee Petherbridge et al., The Federal Circuit and Inequitable Conduct: An Empirical Assessment,
84 S. CAL. L. REV. 1293, 1308 (2011) (“Inequitable [c]onduct [j]urisprudence [e]vinces a [s]trong
[p]reference for [p]atentee [s]uccess.”); see also Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1290.
17
See, e.g., Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1290 (“This court now tightens the standards for finding both
intent and materiality in order to redirect a doctrine that has been overused . . . .”); Cotropia, supra note
6, at 775–83; Lisa A. Dolak, Inequitable Conduct: A Flawed Doctrine Worth Saving, 11 WAKE FOREST
J. BUS. & INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 26–29 (2010) (arguing for more rigorous materiality and intent
requirements).
18
See McGowan, supra note 13.
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driving this result is the fact that, by the time an inequitable conduct charge
is proved and the truth exposed, the patent will be independently found
invalid, rendering the unenforceability penalty superfluous. Because the
interaction between invalidity and unenforceability is key to the argument,
section A first offers a brief discussion of the difference between these two
concepts.
A. Invalidity Versus Unenforceability
1. Invalidity.—Consider an inventor, Andy, who claims to have
invented a widget and files a patent application with the PTO. The job of
the PTO is to issue patents that are valid and prevent invalid patents from
issuing.19 A patent is valid if the invention is new, useful, and nonobvious.20
That is, the invention must work (useful), not be previously known (new),
and also be sufficiently advanced over what was previously known to merit
a patent (nonobvious). Conversely, a patent is invalid if it fails any of these
criteria.
As an initial matter, it is important to understand that invalidity does
not turn on the patentee’s knowledge or state of mind.21 For example, Andy
may very well believe himself to be the first inventor of the widget when
filing the patent. However, it may emerge that an obscure book in a library
in Bangladesh happens to depict the same widget. In this situation, the
patent is invalid, even if Andy did not know of the book and had no
meaningful ability to find it beforehand. 22 The rationale for invalidity is
simply that the widget is not in fact new and thus does not deserve a patent.
Practically speaking, however, a finding of invalidity requires
evidence. Unless and until someone finds the book in Bangladesh, we
cannot know that the widget was not new. Thus, in processing a patent
application, the PTO’s basic job (performed by an “examiner”) is to locate
so-called “prior art”—evidence showing that the invention was previously
known or is obvious, mainly by searching for prior books and journal
articles showing the same widget.23 Similarly, the PTO examiner will be
interested in information documenting whether the widget is operative and
useful.24 The resulting procedure is that, unless the PTO finds information

19

See 35 U.S.C. § 131 (2006).
See id. §§ 101–103.
21
Jonathan S. Masur, Patent Liability Rules as Search Rules, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 187, 190 (2011).
22
See In re Hall, 781 F.2d 897, 899–900 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (finding a single catalogued thesis in a
German university library sufficient to invalidate a patent).
23
U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, MPEP § 704.01, at 700-4 (8th ed. Rev. 9, Aug. 2012)
(“After reading the specification and claims, the examiner searches the prior art.”).
24
See id. § 2107, at 2100-24 to -25 (governing examination for utility).
20
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(i.e., evidence) indicating that a patent is invalid, it will presume that the
patent is valid.25
It follows that the PTO will often erroneously issue a patent on the
belief that it is valid, when in fact the patent is invalid. This does not
necessarily require patentee dishonesty in suppressing information or
hiding evidence. The world of prior art is very vast, and much of it is
extremely obscure—a book in Bangladesh is inherently very hard to find.
Invalid patents are frequently erroneously issued simply because the PTO
lacks perfect information.26
In order to correct such PTO errors, a defense of invalidity is available
in litigation.27 That is, if Andy receives a patent (because the PTO did not
find the book) and sues a defendant for patent infringement, the accused
infringer will be able to argue that the invention is not really new, useful, or
nonobvious, and that the PTO erred in issuing the patent. Again, it is
important to note that the accused infringer does not need to prove that the
patentee committed any dishonesty to prevail on the invalidity defense: all
the accused infringer needs to do is find invalidating prior art such as the
obscure book in Bangladesh. Accused infringers will often succeed where
the PTO examiner failed because they have stronger incentives and more
resources.28 If the book is now found and presented to a court, the patent
will be declared invalid. A patent that is held invalid is treated as a legal
nullity and has no further effect.29
For clarity purposes, it is important to distinguish invalidity as an
intrinsic property of the patent versus invalidity as an administrative or
judicial holding based on available information. In this Article, when I refer
to an invalid patent, I mean a patent covering an old, useless, or obvious
invention, including a situation where no one knows the patent is really
invalid. When I refer to a patent that has been invalidated or found (or
declared, or held) invalid, I mean a patent where the defect in the invention
has been discovered and presented to a tribunal such as the PTO or a court,
so that the patent is declared to be a legal nullity with no further effect.

25

See In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443, 1445 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (“[T]he examiner bears the initial
burden, on review of the prior art or on any other ground, of presenting a prima facie case of
unpatentability.”).
26
See John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of Litigated Patents,
26 AIPLA Q.J. 185, 205 (1998) (46% of litigated patents are ultimately declared invalid by courts).
27
See 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2006) (providing defense of invalidity). Another mechanism to invalidate a
patent after issuance is to seek reexamination in the PTO, which can revoke an issued patent if new
information becomes available. See id. §§ 302–305 (providing for reexamination).
28
See Doug Lichtman & Mark A. Lemley, Rethinking Patent Law’s Presumption of Validity,
60 STAN. L. REV. 45, 47 (2007).
29
See Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 350 (1971) (holding that a
judgment of invalidity can be asserted by all future accused infringers against the patent).
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2. Unenforceability for Inequitable Conduct.—As emphasized in the
last section, an invalid patent may be issued without any dishonesty on the
patentee’s part. An obscure book located in a Bangladesh library is hard to
find, and unless it is found the PTO will issue the patent. There is no need
for Andy to actively hide the book or to know of its existence. That said,
what happens if—as is often the case—Andy discovers the old book
depicting the widget while his patent application is pending?
From a social point of view, the desirable outcome is for Andy to now
disclose the book to the PTO examiner—if the PTO receives the book, it
will deny the patent; and this denial will prevent an invalid patent from
issuing, which is a social good.30 However, it is easy to see that Andy has a
strong private incentive to do the exact opposite: not only will he not want
to tell the PTO examiner about the book; he will want to further hide the
book by throwing it into the ocean. The policy purpose underlying the
inequitable conduct doctrine is to counteract this incentive for dishonesty
and to encourage honest disclosure.31
Procedurally speaking, inequitable conduct exists as a defense to
patent infringement. When Andy sues someone for patent infringement, the
accused infringer can argue that Andy committed dishonest (or
“inequitable”) conduct before the PTO and that the patent should be held
unenforceable. If the court finds that the patentee made a material
misrepresentation or omission with intent to deceive, it will hold the
patentee guilty of inequitable conduct. 32 Once liability for inequitable
conduct is found, there is only one remedy: unenforceability of the patent.33
Unenforceability means that the patent will be given no further effect.34
In practical effect, an unenforceability judgment is basically identical
to an invalidity judgment.35 The semantic distinction is useful—and will be
maintained throughout this Article—because the two defenses seek to
address different problems and have different triggers. The crux of
invalidity is simply that the invention does not merit a patent. The crux of
unenforceability from inequitable conduct is that the patentee has been
dishonest, and the penalty seeks to punish and deter such dishonesty.

30

See Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 670 (1969) (describing the public interest in removing
invalid patents).
31
See Aptix Corp. v. Quickturn Design Sys., Inc., 269 F.3d 1369, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
32
See Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1287–88 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (en
banc) (listing the two requirements of materiality and intent and noting that “the standards for intent to
deceive and materiality have fluctuated over time”).
33
J.P. Stevens & Co. v. Lex Tex Ltd., 747 F.2d 1553, 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
34
See Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 882 F.2d 1556, 1563 n.7 (Fed. Cir. 1989)
(noting that inequitable conduct cannot be cured by later action).
35
There is one difference, which is that unenforceability renders an entire patent unenforceable
while invalidity may affect only individual claims. See J.P. Stevens, 747 F.2d at 1561. I address the
effect of this difference in Part I.E.1.
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The unenforceability penalty is usually considered to be extremely
severe and to produce a great deal of deterrence. The Federal Circuit calls it
the “atomic bomb” of patent law.36 Scholars have called it a “death penalty”
for patentees. 37 As the next section will show, however, this view is
incorrect in at least some cases. In a case like Andy’s, the unenforceability
penalty is not severe. Rather, it produces no punishment or deterrence at
all.
B. The Problem of Underdeterrence
This section seeks to establish two points. First, contrary to the
conventional wisdom, the unenforceability penalty is not severe in one
critical class of cases: cases where the patent is invalid. Rather, in such
cases the punishment is so weak as to be nonexistent. Second, the
culpability of the patentee is highest when a misstatement results in an
invalid patent being erroneously issued by the PTO. The sum of these two
points is a perverse result: in the cases with the highest culpability, the
punishment and deterrence is weakest. To draw an analogy, it is like saying
that murderers (the worst criminals) get the least prison time.
Let us start with a definition of “culpability.” In fraud law, two factors
are generally considered relevant to determine the culpability of a
misrepresentation: materiality and intent.38 This comports quite well with
common understandings of moral culpability: a misstatement that is
material—that induces a bad consequence—is more culpable than a
misstatement that has no effect. Similarly, intentional misstatements are
usually regarded as more culpable than accidental mistakes. Beyond moral
intuitions, economic analysis reaches the same result: generally speaking,
economic analysis calls for greater punishment of intentional wrongs than
accidental wrongs,39 and it calls for greater punishment of consequential
wrongs than inconsequential ones.40 Standard inequitable conduct doctrine
also defines patentee culpability by these two factors.41

36

Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1288 (quoting Aventis Pharma S.A. v. Amphastar Pharm., Inc., 525 F.3d
1334, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (Rader, J., dissenting)).
37
Cotropia, supra note 6, at 725; Nicole M. Murphy, Note, Inequitable-Conduct Doctrine Reform:
Is the Death Penalty for Patents Still Appropriate?, 93 MINN. L. REV. 2274, 2274 (2009).
38
See, e.g., Merck & Co. v. Reynolds, 130 S. Ct. 1784, 1796 (2010) (defining securities fraud as
making “a material misstatement with an intent to deceive” (emphasis omitted)).
39
See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Theory of Intentional Torts, 1 INT’L
REV. L. & ECON. 127, 135 (1981) (arguing that the transaction costs of avoiding intentional wrongs are
lower than for accidental wrongs, therefore justifying supracompensatory damages as a deterrent).
40
See Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to the Law of Evidence, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1477,
1487 (1999) (“It is more important to deter billion-dollar oil spills resulting from negligence than
million-dollar oil spills resulting from negligence.”).
41
See Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1287–88 (“[T]he standards for intent to deceive and materiality have
fluctuated over time.”).
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In the context of the inequitable conduct doctrine, dealing as it does
with misstatements to the PTO, both of these factors correlate strongly to
whether a patent is invalid under the true state of facts. As already
mentioned, the basic job of the PTO is to ensure that old, useless, and
obvious inventions do not get patents.42 A bad consequence is therefore by
definition the erroneous issuance of such an invalid patent, and a patentee
statement that induces this result is thus the most material type of
misrepresentation. 43 On the intent prong, a patentee has the strongest
motivation to make an intentional misrepresentation precisely when it will
ensure that the PTO issues an invalid patent: if the information is
inconsequential, then an applicant will have no motivation to lie about it,
and thus immaterial misstatements are also unlikely to be intentionally
made.44
Therefore, for the purpose of this Article, I will define a “highly
culpable” misstatement as one that results in the erroneous issuance of an
invalid patent, that is, a patent that would be declared invalid if the truth
were known. A “less culpable” misstatement is one that has no effect (i.e.,
the same patent would have issued anyway and is valid even if the truth
were known). In using the terms “misrepresentation” or “misstatement,” I
will include omissions of information. This is because every patentee
makes the affirmative oath to the PTO that he believes himself to be the
first and true inventor of a patentable invention.45 Concealing information
showing the invention to be unpatentable makes this affirmative oath of
true inventorship a misstatement.
Now let us consider the effect of the unenforceability penalty. Return
to the hypothetical patentee, Andy, who hides a prior art book that would
prove his claimed invention is in fact not new. This is highly culpable
misconduct under my definition, since it results in the erroneous issuance
of an invalid patent—if the PTO examiner had been aware of the book, the
patent would not be issued. As a policy matter, we would seek to impose a
very severe penalty for this type of misconduct. Does the unenforceability
remedy achieve this goal?
The answer is “no.” It is important to understand that, in order for a
claim of inequitable conduct to be properly alleged and proven, the accused
infringer must have found the book. If the accused infringer does not find
the book and discover its contents, then he will never know that Andy had
42

See 35 U.S.C. § 131 (2006) (requiring examination of applications based on these considerations).
See Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1291 (holding that, as a general matter, materiality means that at
least one claim of the patent would be invalid if the truth were known to the PTO).
44
There is one situation where materiality and intent diverge and where my definition will not
precisely match our normal intuitions of culpability. Namely, an applicant may mistakenly believe that
some piece of information proves his invention to be invalid and therefore intentionally hide it, even
though the information is in fact harmless. I discuss this situation, which I call the “attempt” problem,
in Part IV.B.2.
45
§ 115 (patentee oath).
43
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hidden anything relevant to the patent—it is nobody’s business if Andy
hides his personal reading habits—and so the accused infringer would have
no foundation to litigate an inequitable conduct defense. But once the book
is found, the patent will be declared invalid for lack of novelty, and the
unenforceability penalty becomes superfluous. Whether the book is found
or not, there is no punishment levied specifically for the dishonest behavior
and therefore no incentive for honesty.46
Another way of seeing this point is to consider Andy’s incentives at
the time of deciding whether to disclose the book to the PTO. Andy’s
calculus will go like this: If I disclose the book, the PTO will certainly deny
my patent. Conversely, if I hide the book, then I will gain a patent unless
and until I am caught, and even if I am caught the worst outcome is to lose
the patent. Andy is therefore strictly better off to hide the book and gain the
chance of evasion, as well as monopoly profits in the interim.
Generalizing from this example, the more culpable the patentee’s
dishonesty (i.e., the more likely that the patent is really invalid), the less ex
ante deterrence the unenforceability penalty will provide against that
misconduct. This is because an accused infringer must first discover the
concealed information before he can prove a claim of inequitable conduct
and apply the unenforceability remedy. Once the concealed information is
exposed, however, a patent that was obtained through highly culpable
fraud—i.e., by suppressing the damning information—is likely to be
invalidated on its own merits. This renders the unenforceability penalty
superfluous in precisely the worst types of cases. Too little punishment for
serious dishonesty, in turn, means that serious dishonesty is more likely to
occur in the PTO.
The severity of this underdeterrence problem is made starker by
comparing patents to any other government-issued entitlement, even
entitlements created to incentivize and reward important social
contributions. Imagine a nonveteran is discovered to have fraudulently
claimed veterans’ benefits. It would be regarded as an obvious first step to
terminate the further flow of benefits to that person, 47 not as a drastic
“atomic bomb” remedy to do so. It is also an obvious second step to require
the fraudster to pay back all the previously received benefits.48 But in patent
law the courts regard the analogous remedy—disgorgement of prior
monopoly profits—as unimaginable, given that the termination of future

46

See JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION
181 & n.3 (Clarendon 1879) (1780) (arguing that a “punishment should be adjusted in such manner to
each particular offence, that for every part of the mischief there may be a motive to restrain the offender
from giving birth to it” (emphasis added)).
47
See 38 U.S.C. § 6103 (2006) (forfeiture of benefits for fraud).
48
See id. § 6108 (authorizing courts to require restitution of fraudulently claimed benefits to the
Department of Veterans Affairs).
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monopoly profits is already an “atomic bomb.”49 Finally, in the veterans
context, it would be an obvious third step to levy a real punishment on the
fraudster, such as fines or prison, over and above terminating future
benefits and requiring repayment of past benefits,50 but fines and prison are
likewise considered unimaginably draconian measures in the patentee
context. The fact that commonsense remedies in any other context are
considered unimaginably draconian in patent law indicates that, far from
being unduly harsh, the law of inequitable conduct is in fact unduly
favorable to patentees.
C. The Problem of Overdeterrence
In contrast to Andy, let us consider a different patentee, Betty, who
invents a pill that cures AIDS. This is plainly a new, useful, and
nonobvious invention deserving a patent. However, in filling out the patent
application, Betty makes a minor error: she misstates her citizenship as
“China,” when she is in fact a citizen of Chile. What happens if Betty’s
error is deemed to be inequitable conduct and her patent is thereby
rendered unenforceable?51
At the outset, it is immediately apparent that, in this context, the
unenforceability penalty has a very large effect. In the absence of the error,
Betty would still have a valid and valuable patent on the cure for AIDS.
Rendering this patent unenforceable therefore deprives Betty of a large
amount of value, akin to levying a gigantic fine.
Not only is the punishment effect very large, the culpability of the
“misconduct” that triggers it is very small. All Betty has done is to make an
obvious typographical error. After all, Betty has no apparent motive to
misstate her citizenship—a citizen of Chile gets the same patent rights as a
citizen of China, on the same terms, and for the same duration. 52 The
misstatement also causes no noticeable prejudice to the public or to the

49

See Allison Pruitt, Note, Keeping Patent Applicants Honest: A Proposal to Apply Disgorgement
Remedies to Findings of Inequitable Conduct During Patent Prosecution, 13 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 465,
487–88 (2006) (proposing such a remedy but acknowledging there is no present authority supporting it).
50
See § 6102 (criminalizing fraudulently obtaining veterans benefits and prescribing fines for
violations).
51
One intuitive response might be that the error is so plainly trivial that no court would ever find
Betty guilty of inequitable conduct. In Part III, I will discuss the effect of varying the standard for
imposing liability in more detail. At present, however, the purpose of this section is to explore the effect
of the unenforceability penalty if it is applied to a case like Betty’s precisely to show why such
application is a bad idea. And it is at least plausible that Betty might be found guilty of inequitable
conduct, since the statute specifically requires patent applicants to state their citizenship. See 35 U.S.C.
§ 115 (2006).
52
See Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property art. 2, done as revised July 14,
1967, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305 [hereinafter Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial
Property].
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PTO. In short, in the context of harmless errors, the unenforceability
penalty exacts the strongest punishment for the least culpable offenses.
The problem is not merely a matter of intrinsic unfairness, though that
too is a concern. A more tangible problem is that such heavy punishment of
trivial errors creates overdeterrence and inefficiently high levels of
precaution. 53 What will a patent applicant do in the future, upon seeing
Betty’s example? The logical result would be to double- and triple-check
the statement of citizenship, and all the other statements made in patent
applications, for minor typos. This is a highly inefficient use of social
resources: while typo-free patent applications might be a good thing in the
abstract, having patent applicants spend millions of dollars in attorneys’
fees to ensure typo-free patent applications is not.
The overdeterrence problem has been exhaustively described in the
literature.54 The result of imposing severe punishment for minor mistakes is
that patent applicants take excessive precautions against making them, such
as by flooding the PTO with every tangentially relevant book and article
and double- and triple-checking against typos and minor misstatements.55
This is wasteful and increases the social cost of the patent system.
D. A Model of the Over- and Underdeterrence Effects
The above sections provide two extreme examples to demonstrate the
upside-down effect: Andy hides information that would clearly invalidate
his patent and receives zero punishment; Betty misstates information that
has no bearing on the validity of her patent and receives severe punishment.
Of course, patentee culpability is not truly a dichotomous on–off
switch, but runs in degrees. Failing to disclose information to the PTO runs
the gamut from “completely justified” (if the information is utterly
irrelevant), to “likely excusable” (if the information is only tangentially
relevant), to “dubious” (if the information is likely, but not certain, to
invalidate the patent if known), to “damning” (if the information is certain
to invalidate the patent if known). In other words, patent invalidity based
on a particular reference is probabilistic,56 and some types of information
53

See Melvin A. Eisenberg, Mistake in Contract Law, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 1573, 1579 (2003).
See, e.g., Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1289 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (en
banc) (“[P]atent prosecutors regularly bury PTO examiners with a deluge of prior art references, most
of which have marginal value.”); 154 CONG. REC. 22,629–30 (2008) (statement of Sen. Jon Kyl)
(arguing that patent applicants “flood the Office with prior-art references but offer no explanation” as to
their relevancy); Cotropia, supra note 6, at 770–73 (arguing that inequitable conduct results in
overcompliance).
55
Another harm that is often asserted is that applicants are deterred from explaining the materiality
of references that they submit to the PTO. See, e.g., Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1289. This is an illusory
harm, however, in that patent applicants have no preexisting incentives to honestly identify material
(i.e., damaging) references in the absence of inequitable conduct doctrine.
56
See Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Probabilistic Patents, 19 J. ECON. PERSP. 75, 75–76
(2005).
54
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are more likely to be invalidating than others. The range of culpability
accordingly varies.
This means that the relationship between deterrence effects and
culpability must consider the full spectrum of possible degrees of
culpability. And it can quickly be seen that the inverse relationship persists
for the entire spectrum: The more likely that a prior art reference is to
invalidate the patent, the more culpable the patentee is in hiding it. At the
same time, the more likely that a patent is invalid under the true state of
facts (i.e., with the existence of the reference), the less punishment and ex
ante deterrence the unenforceability penalty provides. This result is
depicted in Figure 1.
FIGURE 1: THE BASIC MODEL OF THE UNENFORCEABILITY PENALTY
Low culpability
High punishment
(Betty)

Deterrence/Punishment

Optimal
Deterrence/
Punishment
Actual
Deterrence/
Punishment

High culpability
Low punishment
(Andy)
Culpability

In Figure 1, the dotted line represents the optimal relationship between
culpability and punishment: generally speaking, from either an instrumental
deterrence or a Kantian retributive justice perspective, we would like to see
increasing punishment with increasing culpability. But, as Figure 1
illustrates, the actual relationship (represented by the solid line) is exactly
contrary. For the lowest culpability cases (Betty), there is the highest
punishment, while for the highest culpability cases (Andy), there is the
lowest punishment.
The reason for this inverse relationship is the overlap between
invalidity and unenforceability: As culpability increases, the patent
becomes more likely to be invalidated if the truth is revealed. But as the
patent becomes more likely to be invalidated, the unenforceability penalty
has less deterrence effect. The result is an upside-down relationship
between culpability and punishment.
1256

107:1243 (2013)

The Upside-Down Inequitable Conduct Defense

This inverse relationship results in two undesirable effects. On the left
side of the diagram, we have overdeterrence, where minor misstatements
not affecting the validity of the patent are strongly punished. Indeed, as the
diagram shows, the clearer it is that a particular error is harmless (i.e., the
further left we go), the stronger the overdeterrence effect becomes.
Conversely, on the right side of the diagram we have underdeterrence,
where patentees hiding highly damaging information are only lightly
punished. And the clearer it is that a concealed piece of information would
invalidate the patent if honestly disclosed (i.e., the further right we go), the
worse the underdeterrence effect and the correspondingly perverse
incentive to conceal.
To be sure, the unenforceability penalty does achieve reasonably good
results close to the center of the diagram. This represents a situation where
the patentee both is somewhat culpable in failing to disclose a particular
piece of information and is somewhat punished for this failure. But this
narrow set of good outcomes is achieved at a heavy price: It both offends
our moral sensibilities and creates highly perverse results when the most
culpable fraudsters receive no punishment, the most innocent errors are
subjected to the heaviest punishment, and only the intermediate cases are
appropriately resolved. To consider an analogy, a criminal sentencing
regime where murderers are let go and jaywalkers are executed would not
be redeemed by giving robbers an appropriate prison sentence.
E. Considering Objections to the Model
1. The Effect of Entire-Patent Unenforceability.—One potential
objection to the model above is that I have failed to consider the fact that
inequitable conduct renders an entire patent unenforceable, while invalidity
might only affect individual claims. To state this objection more clearly, an
initial point to understand is that a patent can have multiple claims to
somewhat different inventions; for example, a patentee may invent both a
pencil and an eraser at the same time and thus have two claims: (1) to the
pencil and (2) to the eraser. 57 The patentee might subsequently discover
prior art showing that pencils already existed in the public domain and
intentionally hide this prior art to obtain the patent. Once the truth is
exposed, only the pencil claim will be found invalid, but the inequitable
conduct penalty will render the entire patent—including the otherwisevalid eraser claim—unenforceable. 58 In this way, the unenforceability
penalty will create some additional deterrence in cases where the patent is
only partially invalid under the true state of facts.
The response to the objection is that my model accounts for this
phenomenon once we clarify the definition of culpability to account for the
57
58

See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006) (a patent may have “one or more claims”).
See J.P. Stevens & Co. v. Lex Tex Ltd., 747 F.2d 1553, 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
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possibility of a patent being partially invalid. Straightforwardly, it is more
culpable for a patentee to hide information that would wholly invalidate his
patent instead of merely partially invalidating it; in our example, it would
be more culpable for the patentee to hide prior art showing both a pencil
and an eraser than merely to hide prior art showing only a pencil. Thus,
when a patentee hides information that has a 100% chance of invalidating
50% of the patent (and by this I mean 50% of its monopoly value, not the
number of claims per se), this is just like a situation where a patentee hides
information that has a 50% probability of invalidating the entire patent—he
sits in the middle portion of the diagram, where he is somewhat culpable
and somewhat punished. As Figure 1 shows, the more culpable the patentee
is—the closer the information hidden comes to a 100% probability of
invalidating all the claims in the patent—the less the punishment imposed.
Therefore, the fundamental point of upside-down patentee incentives
stands.
2. The Potential for a “Smear” Effect on Invalidity Findings.—A
second objection is that my model above relies on the independence
between dishonest conduct and a judicial finding of invalidity, whereas in
practice this might not strictly be the case. That is, a judge who hears about
a patentee’s dishonesty might thereby become prejudiced against the
patentee, and this might make the judge more likely to find the patent
invalid rather than waiting to find it unenforceable.59 If committing highly
culpable dishonesty not only makes a finding of inequitable conduct more
likely but also makes a finding of invalidity more likely, then this would
provide some additional deterrence against highly culpable misconduct.
I have three responses to this objection. First, it obviously contradicts
the formal doctrine: Invalidity is not supposed to depend on the patentee’s
honesty or lack thereof—an old, useless, or obvious invention is invalid
whether the patentee acted honestly or not.60 And the legal system usually
tries very hard to make sure that decisionmakers are not prejudiced by
formally irrelevant considerations.61 Thus, to the extent that judicial bias
59

For obvious reasons of delicacy, this argument is often made in the form of imputing an
improper motivation for accused infringers to allege inequitable conduct rather than attributing
responsibility to the judge. See Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1288 (arguing that “inequitable conduct has
become a significant litigation strategy” because the allegations “cast a dark cloud over the patent’s
validity and paint the patentee as a bad actor”). But the “dark cloud” would exist, and the strategy
would be worthwhile, only to the extent that judges can be improperly influenced.
60
See supra text accompanying notes 21–22.
61
See Andrew J. Wistrich et al., Can Judges Ignore Inadmissible Information? The Difficulty of
Deliberately Disregarding, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1251, 1252 (2005) (“Decisions based on inadmissible
evidence, or on admissible evidence used for an improper purpose, are illegitimate and violate
principles of due process.” (footnotes omitted)). Moreover, the general assumption is that judges
succeed in overcoming the temptation to consider irrelevant facts. See id. at 1255–56 (summarizing the
conventional arguments that judges can overcome prejudice). But see id. at 1286–1322 (presenting
experimental results that cast doubt on this).
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can ameliorate the underdeterrence effect I have identified, it is a case of
two wrongs offsetting each other. It would be a strange defense of the
conventional wisdom indeed for someone to argue that the problem I
identify is “solved” by the possibility of judicial prejudice.
Second, to the extent that an increased chance of invalidity might
produce deterrence, it is the invalidity judgment that is doing all the work,
not the unenforceability penalty. Thus, the conventional wisdom about the
unenforceability penalty—that it is a uniformly draconian sanction that
deters patentees from all misconduct big and small—is still wrong. And the
model in Figure 1, which concerns the incentives produced by the
unenforceability penalty, is still correct, even if there is now another factor
that ameliorates the underdeterrence effect (and so the practical
consequences are not as dire).
Third, the possibility of improper judicial bias in finding invalidity
ameliorates, but does not eliminate, the upside-down effect. At the
extremes, patentees still have upside-down incentives, and in equal
magnitude. A patentee such as Andy already knows he has a 100% chance
of the patent being found invalid if the truth is ever discovered, even
without the judge being biased against him. The result is that Andy’s
incentives are completely unchanged by the possibility that a judge finding
out about his dishonesty might become biased against him—the judge
cannot become more likely to invalidate the patent. Andy still has
everything to gain, and nothing to lose, by hiding the damaging information
because the payoff to dishonesty comes from the possibility of evading
detection. Thus, although there will be less over- and underdeterrence for
cases of intermediate culpability (i.e., in the middle portion of the diagram),
at the extremes—where the most serious problem lies in the first place—
the basic problem remains.
F. The Difference from the Conventional Wisdom
The sum of my analysis above is that inequitable conduct produces
both underdeterrence and overdeterrence. This contrasts sharply from the
conventional wisdom, which usually views the problem solely as one of
overdeterrence. 62 Thus, the unenforceability penalty is referred to as an
“atomic bomb” or a “death penalty,” 63 while the inequitable conduct
defense has been called an “absolute plague.” 64 Common proposals for
reform are aimed exclusively at reducing the punishment and deterrence
62

See, e.g., Cotropia, supra note 6 (arguing that inequitable conduct causes overdisclosure);
Thomas F. Cotter, An Economic Analysis of Patent Law’s Inequitable Conduct Doctrine, 53 ARIZ. L.
REV. 735, 778 (2011) (“[U]ncertainties in the operation of existing doctrine may induce risk-averse
agents to overdisclose . . . .”).
63
See supra text accompanying notes 36–37.
64
Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 876 n.15 (Fed. Cir. 1988)
(quoting Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Dayco Corp., 849 F.2d 1418, 1422 (Fed. Cir. 1988)).
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effect of inequitable conduct, such as by raising the standards of intent and
materiality, 65 raising the burden of proof, 66 reducing the penalty by
rendering unenforceable only certain claims of a patent (rather than the
patent in its entirety),67 and implementing a one-sided cost-shifting regime
where accused infringers that raise an inequitable conduct defense and lose
would have to pay attorneys’ fees to victorious patentees.68
A skeptical reader might be concerned that I have overstated the
degree of consensus in the conventional wisdom. After all, the recent case
of Therasense, which quite severely narrowed the inequitable conduct
doctrine, nonetheless also produced a dissent by Judge Bryson that three
other judges joined. At first blush, this would suggest that there is a
contrary view being voiced, albeit by a minority of judges. Even a cursory
reading of the dissenting opinion, however, dashes any hopes on this front.
Here is how the dissent begins:
There is broad consensus that the law of inequitable conduct is in an
unsatisfactory state and needs adjustment. . . . In litigation, counterclaims of
inequitable conduct have been raised in too many cases and have proved
difficult to resolve. In the PTO, . . . inequitable conduct has led some patent
prosecutors to err on the side of “overdisclosure” in order to avoid the risk of
rendering all claims of an otherwise valid patent unenforceable . . . .69

The dissent then states its core disagreement with the majority:
[T]he majority’s new test . . . does not merely reform the doctrine of
inequitable conduct, but comes close to abolishing it altogether. I
respectfully dissent from that aspect of the court’s decision.70

Judge Bryson’s dissent does not exactly give voice to the
underdeterrence problems of inequitable conduct doctrine. Rather, it brings
to mind the old joke that a conservative judge believes there is no
meritorious habeas petition in a thousand, while a liberal judge believes
there is one. The difference between the majority and the dissent in
Therasense is only that the majority believes that inequitable conduct
claims are always frivolous and draconian and wants to abolish the defense
de facto, while the dissent believes that inequitable conduct allegations are
merely almost always frivolous and would not go as far as abolition. The
65

See, e.g., Mammen, supra note 6 (proposing to raise standards of intent and materiality); David
O. Taylor, Patent Fraud, 83 TEMP. L. REV. 49, 73–80 (2010) (arguing for higher intent and materiality
standards).
66
See Exergen Corp. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 575 F.3d 1312, 1327–28 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (requiring
heightened pleading, including pleading intent with particularity).
67
See Cotropia, supra note 6, at 774–75; Dolak, supra note 17, at 30–31.
68
See, e.g., Dolak, supra note 17, at 31; Kevin Mack, Note, Reforming Inequitable Conduct to
Improve Patent Quality: Cleansing Unclean Hands, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 147, 172 (2006).
69
Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1302 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (en banc)
(Bryson, J., dissenting).
70
Id. at 1304 (emphasis added).
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consensus among all the judges is that inequitable conduct allegations are
“raised in too many cases” and that the threat of unenforceability leads to
“overdisclosure” to the PTO. The same view is shared by almost all
members of the patent community, as a quick look at the amicus lineup in
Therasense reveals.71 The fact that even the dissenters start off by joining
this “broad consensus” forcefully demonstrates the lopsided nature of the
conventional wisdom.
II. UPSIDE-DOWN INCENTIVES FOR ACCUSED INFRINGERS
As shown in Part I, the unenforceability penalty produces both overand underdeterrence. It produces overdeterrence in cases of low culpability
and underdeterrence in cases of high culpability. Despite this effect, the
common perception of the penalty invariably focuses on its potential
overdeterrence effect. Even the dissenters concede this point at a
fundamental level and only quibble at the edges. If my analysis is right,
then why does no one worry—or at least worry very much—about the
underdeterrence problem?
One potential answer, suggested in Part I, is that the conventional
wisdom has simply failed to consider the marginal effect, as opposed to the
overall result, of unenforceability. That is, holding a patent unenforceable
sounds at first blush to be very severe—until one considers that the patent
might be invalid anyway, a point that is easy to miss.72 And much of the
reason for the conventional wisdom can probably be attributed to this
phenomenon.
This Part provides a second, complementary answer. Judges and
commentators rarely consider the possibility of underdeterrence, which
arises in the relatively more culpable cases of patentee dishonesty (the right
side of Figure 1), because they believe that such highly culpable patentee
dishonesty almost never occurs in the PTO.73 My argument in this Part is
that this belief in intrinsic patentee honesty arises because of a litigation
selection effect and is therefore based on an illusion. As section A will
demonstrate, the more culpable the patentee’s misconduct, the less likely it
is that an accused infringer will bring such misconduct to light by mounting
an inequitable conduct defense. The effect of this selection effect on
71

See id. at 1289, 1294 (majority opinion) (noting wide support for narrowing doctrine).
Cf. Donald J. Boudreaux et al., Talk Is Cheap: The Existence Value Fallacy, 29 ENVTL. L. 765,
786–87 (1999) (describing, in the environmental protection context, how legal analysis often fails to
consider marginal effects). In a different context of patent law, Mark Lemley has noted the need to
isolate the marginal effect of the remedy in the context of patent misuse because the patent misuse
remedy frequently overlaps with antitrust remedies. See Mark A. Lemley, Comment, The Economic
Irrationality of the Patent Misuse Doctrine, 78 CALIF. L. REV. 1599, 1615–18 (1990).
73
See FED. TRADE COMM’N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION
AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY ch. 5, at 11 & n.72 (2003) (“Hearing testimony generally indicated that,
so far as it goes, the duty of candor induces substantial compliance,” even though “noncompliance
penalties are rare.”); see also infra text accompanying note 100.
72

1261

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

perceptions about patentee honesty and corresponding judicial (and
legislative) beliefs about the need for an inequitable conduct doctrine to
deter dishonesty are explored in sections B and C.
A. The Selection of Defenses in Litigation
Consider two accused infringers facing two different lawsuits by two
different patentees. In Lawsuit A, the accused infringer discovers that the
patentee had misstated information to the PTO, and the information is
sufficient to invalidate the patent. For example, the accused infringer
discovers an old book depicting the invention and thereby showing that the
patentee’s invention is not new. In Lawsuit B, the accused infringer
discovers that the patentee had misstated something that does not really
affect the validity of the patent, such as making a typo in the patentee’s
address. What should each accused infringer do?
In Lawsuit A, the accused infringer will immediately file a summary
judgment motion for the invalidity of the patent. Importantly, the basis of
the summary judgment motion will not be that the patentee lied to the PTO
and is guilty of inequitable conduct—at this point the accused infringer
may suspect this to be the case but has no concrete evidence. Rather than
investigate the patentee’s knowledge and intent, it is far easier to simply
submit the (now discovered) critical document showing that the invention
is not new and the patent is invalid for lack of novelty. At this point the
case will end, since the patent is now invalidated and void.74 No evidence
of patentee dishonesty will ever be located, let alone presented to a court.
There is little incentive for an accused infringer to undertake the
additional task of discovering evidence and then proving in court that the
patent applicant intentionally misled the PTO, which is required to show
inequitable conduct but not to establish invalidity. First, collecting evidence
showing that the patentee had knowledge of the omitted information is
difficult enough. Second, even after it is established that the patentee knew
about the book and did not submit it to the PTO, the patentee will certainly
still claim that it was an inadvertent mistake rather than intentional fraud—
that he simply forgot to submit the book or that he believed the book was
not relevant. Proving the patentee’s true intent in the face of such selfserving litigation denials is almost impossible because the Federal Circuit
has erected a very high standard of proof.75 Finally, and most importantly,
there is very little benefit to the accused infringer in undertaking these
74

See Mycogen Plant Sci., Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 243 F.3d 1316, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (dismissing
the inequitable conduct issue as moot in light of invalidity); see also Joovy LLC v. Target Corp., 437 F.
App’x 932, 938 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (accused infringer voluntarily waiving inequitable conduct claim upon
finding of invalidity).
75
Specifically, as described in Part II.C.1, the Federal Circuit holds that a patentee’s knowing
suppression of invalidating prior art is not evidence of intent to deceive the PTO. See Optium Corp. v.
Emcore Corp., 603 F.3d 1313, 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
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costly burdens. Even if the accused infringer succeeds, the only thing he
gains is a judgment of unenforceability, which is superfluous in light of the
judgment of invalidity. Because proving patentee intent is all work for no
gain, a rational accused infringer in Lawsuit A will focus on invalidity and
ignore inequitable conduct.
This is a slight simplification, in the sense that there is one small
benefit for an accused infringer to prove inequitable conduct, over and
above the remedy for proving the invalidity of the entire patent.76 A finding
of inequitable conduct opens the possibility of—but does not mandate—an
award of attorneys’ fees.77 But this is a minor issue in comparison to the
much higher stakes of winning the overall case—even the conventional
wisdom has always treated attorneys’ fees as small potatoes.78 The sum is
that invalidity is far easier to prove than inequitable conduct, for almost the
same result, and so in a world of limited litigation resources,79 an accused
infringer who has a strong invalidity defense will devote most of his
resources to invalidity and treat inequitable conduct as, at most, an
afterthought. 80 Perhaps, due to an abundance of caution, the accused
infringer will not completely ignore the inequitable conduct charge, but he
will devote less attention to it. Notably, this effect occurs even without
considering the possibility of settlement, which would reduce the incentive
for litigation even further.81
The picture flips 180 degrees when we consider Lawsuit B, where the
accused infringer does not have a reasonable invalidity argument, since the
patent applicant’s address does not affect whether the invention is new,
useful, or nonobvious. Now the accused infringer has every incentive to
emphasize the patentee’s misstatement to the patent office and play up the
inequitable conduct defense, 82 spending a great deal of his brief on this
76

Another benefit of unenforceability comes into play when the patent is only partially invalid,
where there is some incentive for an accused infringer to litigate inequitable conduct in order to render
the entire patent unenforceable. See supra Part I.E.1. But in those cases, the patentee’s culpability is
also lessened, since the patent is only partly undeserved, and this again demonstrates the upside-down
effect that accused infringers have more incentive to litigate precisely when the patentee’s culpability is
lower.
77
See Brasseler, U.S.A. I, L.P. v. Stryker Sales Corp., 267 F.3d 1370, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
78
See Norton v. Curtiss, 433 F.2d 779, 795 (C.C.P.A. 1970) (noting that whether the patent would
be held unenforceable when the asserted claims were already invalidated “would really be of secondary
importance”).
79
This is especially the case when invalidity and inequitable conduct are competing for the same
scarce litigation resources. See, e.g., FED. R. APP. P. 32(a)(7) (imposing word limit on briefs). Arguing
inequitable conduct then detracts from the all-important invalidity argument.
80
See infra Part IV.C.4 for more discussion of the inadequacy of attorneys’ fees as a solution to the
upside-down effects.
81
See generally George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J.
LEGAL STUD. 1 (1984) (presenting a model where litigation occurs only when parties fail to settle).
82
For example, the accused infringer would probably argue that the misstatement is “intentional”
since the patentee must have known his own address and is “material” because getting the right address
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issue. This is, to be sure, a very weak argument for the accused infringer.
But it is stronger than all of his alternatives. The adage “beggars can’t be
choosers” applies.
This upside-down selection effect explains a phenomenon that courts
have long observed, which is that accused infringers devote enormous
amounts of resources to litigating obviously weak inequitable conduct
cases.83 Judges are often mystified by this phenomenon and emerge with
the conclusion that accused infringers have extremely zealous lawyers. 84
The same judges then engage in this reasoning: If accused infringers will so
zealously litigate even a weak inequitable conduct case involving trivial
mistakes, then they would surely even more zealously litigate a strong
inequitable conduct case involving real patentee misconduct, and the fact
that I almost never see any such strong inequitable conduct cases therefore
tells me that such serious misconduct does not actually happen.85 Courts
therefore emerge with a strong belief in intrinsic patentee honesty.86
The basic point of this section is that courts are correct in observing
that accused infringers will zealously litigate many weak inequitable
conduct cases. But they are wrong to believe that just because someone will
zealously litigate a weak inequitable conduct case, the same person would
zealously litigate a strong inequitable conduct case, and therefore are also
wrong to draw the inference that the lack of strong cases in litigation is
because such strong cases do not exist. Rather, the counterintuitive result
shown by my analysis is that accused infringers will zealously litigate weak
inequitable conduct cases but will treat strong ones as afterthoughts.
One criticism of my analysis will likely be that it must be wrong in
positing that strong inequitable conduct cases are neglected because
virtually every accused infringer alleges inequitable conduct in their
pleadings. 87 It is true enough that inequitable conduct is almost always
on a patent is oh-so-important for the public interest. Of course, these are extremely weak arguments.
But that is the point of the selection effect.
83
See, e.g., Allied Colloids Inc. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 64 F.3d 1570, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1995)
(observing that “every patentee’s imperfections were promoted to ‘inequitable conduct’” by accused
infringers); Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Dayco Corp., 849 F.2d 1418, 1422 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (“Reputable
lawyers seem to feel compelled to make the charge against other reputable lawyers on the slenderest
grounds . . . .”).
84
See, e.g., Burlington, 849 F.2d at 1422 (speculating that accused infringers’ lawyers “make the
charge against other reputable lawyers . . . to represent their client’s interests adequately, perhaps”).
85
See id. (“They get anywhere with the accusation in but a small percentage of the cases.”); see
also Katherine Nolan-Stevaux, Note, Inequitable Conduct Claims in the 21st Century: Combating the
Plague, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 147, 161–62 (2005) (explicitly arguing that the low win rate for
accused infringers is “indicative of the rare circumstances in which patentees blatantly engaged in
inequitable conduct”).
86
Burlington, 849 F.2d at 1422 (calling allegations of inequitable conduct “an absolute plague”).
87
Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 876 n.15 (Fed. Cir. 1988)
(“The habit of charging inequitable conduct in almost every major patent case has become an absolute
plague.” (alteration omitted) (quoting Burlington, 849 F.2d at 1422)).
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alleged, but this actually reinforces my point. The costs for accused
infringers arise when the accused infringer seeks to prove inequitable
conduct with concrete evidence but do not arise in simply alleging it. It is
costly to pay lawyers and detectives to dig up reliable evidence of patentee
dishonesty, and it consumes valuable briefing space and limited trial
presentation time to contest the issue. But it is almost costless to include a
pro forma allegation, since there are no word limits for pleadings and the
attorneys’ fees required are minimal.88
The result is that virtually every accused infringer—including those
with strong cases—will allege inequitable conduct in their pleadings.89 At
the same time, the defense is rarely seriously pursued: inequitable conduct
defenses are litigated to a conclusion in only 16% to 35% of reported
cases.90 Thus, as the litigation process proceeds—and as the cost of actually
collecting evidence and presenting the argument to judges increases—a
large majority of inequitable conduct allegations are left to wither while
other defenses are pursued instead. This reinforces the illusion of patentee
honesty because, in the conventional wisdom, the fact that an allegation of
inequitable conduct is made but then abandoned is taken to indicate its
frivolousness.91 My analysis, however, suggests that accused infringers will
abandon (or, at most, only halfheartedly pursue) many strong inequitable
conduct cases involving serious misconduct because in those cases the
invalidity defense is more promising and there is little further to gain by
pursuing the inequitable conduct defense.
B. The Effect on Judicial Perceptions
What happens over the long run when judges see only weak
inequitable conduct cases being litigated and never strong cases? As a great
88

The only cost is potential sanctions for making frivolous allegations. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11. This
cost has not been significant because Rule 11 has not traditionally been seriously enforced. See S. REP.
NO. 104-98, at 13–14 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 692–93 (noting that Rule 11
motions are expensive to file and courts are hesitant to impose sanctions even when violations are
proved). The Federal Circuit has recently begun to take pleading requirements for inequitable conduct
more seriously. See infra note 103 and accompanying text. Whether this new standard has or will
reduce the number of allegations—and whether the effect will fall on the frivolous or meritorious
allegations—has not been well studied.
89
Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1289 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (en banc).
90
Mack, supra note 68, at 155–56; Benjamin Brown, Comment, Inequitable Conduct: A Standard
in Motion, 19 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 593, 607–08 (2009) (reporting that
inequitable conduct was addressed, on average, in 20% of reported patent cases from 2000 to 2007).
91
See Burlington, 849 F.2d at 1422 (noting that accused infringers “get anywhere with the
accusation in but a small percentage of the cases” and therefore labeling the allegations as an “absolute
plague”); see also Patent Reform: The Future of American Innovation: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 24 (2007) [hereinafter Patent Reform Hearing] (statement of Kathryn L.
Biberstein, Senior Vice President, General Counsel and Secretary, Chief Compliance Officer,
Alkermes, Inc.) (“I do not believe that inequitable conduct is an issue in patent prosecution today
because it is rarely found to exist.”).
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deal of literature has shown—and as common sense would indicate—they
start believing that serious patentee misconduct never really occurs, merely
because they do not see such misconduct in the cases before them.92 This is
known as “availability bias,” where people overestimate the statistical
frequency of events that they have vivid knowledge of and underestimate
those that they do not.93 The perception of widespread patentee honesty will
therefore arise even if serious patentee misconduct is in fact rampant. And
once judges start believing that true patentee misconduct rarely occurs, they
then change doctrine to cut back the inequitable conduct defense.94
The doctrinal reaction has a further effect: making inequitable conduct
claims even harder to prove makes accused infringers with reasonable
invalidity defenses devote even fewer resources to the inequitable conduct
argument because the burden is now higher and the expected reward is
even less. For accused infringers with no other options, the adage that
beggars can’t be choosers still applies, so they will still make the
inequitable conduct argument. Thus, a vicious cycle begins where courts
now see even more pathetically weak cases by desperate accused infringers
and even fewer meritorious cases. Judges think that real patentee
misconduct occurs even less frequently than before, making them narrow
the doctrine even further. The cycle then continuously repeats.
I should make clear that, in arguing that there is no evidence to justify
the belief in intrinsic patentee honesty, I have no empirical evidence
demonstrating the opposite. That is, I cannot demonstrate that patentee
dishonesty is in fact rampant in the PTO, besides the fact that there is an
obvious incentive for patentees to use fraud to obtain undeserved patents
and the fact that there is no punishment levied for such fraud once we
consider overlap with invalidity. My more limited point is that a great deal
of doctrinal narrowing has been enacted (and even more proposed) based
on the unsubstantiated belief in patentee honesty, which is in turn based on
92

See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Do Cases Make Bad Law?, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 883, 893–99 (2006);
Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCIENCE
1124, 1127–28 (1974).
93
See Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 15, at 207–08.
94
A similar phenomenon occurs in Fourth Amendment litigation under the exclusionary rule. As
Nancy Leong has discussed, the only people who are likely to invoke the exclusionary rule are clearly
guilty criminal defendants who are trying to exclude the very evidence that demonstrates their guilt. See
Nancy Leong, Making Rights, 92 B.U. L. REV. 405, 434–35 (2012); see also Christopher Slobogin, Why
Liberals Should Chuck the Exclusionary Rule, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 363, 403–04 (“[U]nder the
exclusionary regime, the Fourth Amendment is virtually always associated with a criminal; only people
who have been found in possession of evidence of a crime seek exclusion.”). This means the most
common type of Fourth Amendment challenge to police conduct involves a search that yields
incriminating evidence, and judges rarely encounter an abusive search that violates citizen privacy
without yielding any evidence. The result is that judges start to believe that abusive searches are rare,
and they narrow the Fourth Amendment as a result. See Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First
Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 799 (1994) (“In the popular mind, the Amendment has lost its
luster and become associated with grinning criminals getting off on crummy technicalities.”).
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faulty inferences from litigation win rates. 95 The only clear point that
litigation evidence—tainted by the selection effect—supplies is that serious
patentee dishonesty at least sometimes occurs.96 Despite the extremely high
burden of proof and the lack of incentives to litigate the issue in high
culpability cases, claims of inequitable conduct do occasionally succeed,
and in the vast majority of those successful cases the patent is also
invalidated.97 This means that there are at least some cases where patentees
have obtained undeserved patents through fraud—and where they have
received no punishment even after being caught.
C. Matching Theory to Empirics: The Universal Unpopularity of
Inequitable Conduct
Because of the perception created by the litigation selection effect, the
inequitable conduct doctrine is almost universally unpopular, and it is
unpopular for the specific reason that it is believed to produce draconian
overdeterrence against innocent patentees (i.e., not because people believe
it produces insufficient deterrence against fraudulent patentees). This is
reflected by the fact that all three branches of government have taken
action to narrow its applicability. This section will examine each branch
separately.
1. The Federal Circuit: Narrowing Doctrine.—As mentioned
already, the Federal Circuit has not hesitated to use strong language to
condemn the inequitable conduct doctrine. This is because its judges
believe that patentees are in fact almost never dishonest to the PTO and that
the doctrine serves little purpose beyond harming innocent patent owners
and providing windfalls to evil infringers. Thus, the Federal Circuit calls
allegations of inequitable conduct “an absolute plague,”98 and considers the
unenforceability remedy an “atomic bomb” that should rarely, if ever, be
deployed. 99 And, reflecting their belief that serious patentee misconduct
basically never happens, the same judges regularly state that allegations of
patentee dishonesty are “overplayed” and generally frivolous.100

95

See infra Parts II.C.1 (judicial changes) and II.C.3 (legislative changes).
See, e.g., Advanced Magnetic Closures, Inc. v. Rome Fastener Corp., 607 F.3d 817, 830 (Fed.
Cir. 2010) (affirming the lower court’s findings that a patent applicant fabricated evidence to deceive
the PTO).
97
Wasserman, supra note 12, at 23. Paradoxically, Wasserman views this as a reason to narrow the
inequitable conduct doctrine. See id.
98
Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 876 n.15 (Fed. Cir. 1988)
(quoting Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Dayco Corp., 849 F.2d 1418, 1422 (Fed. Cir. 1988)).
99
Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1288–90 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (en banc)
(quoting Aventis Pharma S.A. v. Amphastar Pharm., Inc., 525 F.3d 1334, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (Rader,
J., dissenting)).
100
Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1289 (quoting Kimberly–Clark Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 745 F.2d
1437, 1454 (Fed. Cir. 1984)); see MySpace, Inc. v. GraphOn Corp., 672 F.3d 1250, 1261 (Fed. Cir.
96
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Not surprisingly, the Federal Circuit carries these sentiments into its
doctrine, so that inequitable conduct has an extraordinarily high burden of
proof. As the authors of a recent empirical study summarize their findings,
the Federal Circuit’s “[i]nequitable conduct jurisprudence evinces a strong
preference for patentee success.”101 A comparison to other types of fraud
illustrates how this incredibly onerous burden of proof works.
First, the Federal Circuit has imposed extremely severe pleading
requirements. Although Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) requires
allegations of fraud to be pleaded with specificity, the rule also provides
that the intent element may be pleaded without specificity.102 The Federal
Circuit, however, requires intent to deceive to be pleaded with specificity to
show that nefarious intent, rather than innocent mistake, is the single most
reasonable inference on the facts pleaded. 103 This heightened pleading
standard is the most onerous in all of civil litigation. As a striking
comparison, this single-most-plausible-inference standard is the precise
standard that the Supreme Court rejected for allegations of securities
fraud,104 even after the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995
(PSLRA) had specifically enacted a requirement of heightened pleading for
intent.105 The PSLRA pleading standard is usually understood as the most
onerous pleading requirement that Congress could imagine, 106 yet the
Federal Circuit’s pleading standard for inequitable conduct exceeds it.
Second, on the merits, the Federal Circuit imposes a high burden of
proof, requiring inequitable conduct to be proven by clear and convincing
evidence.107 The court has imposed this high burden of proof explicitly for

2012) (describing inequitable conduct allegations as a “toss-in”); Multiform Desiccants, Inc. v.
Medzam, Ltd., 133 F.3d 1473, 1482 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Burlington, 849 F.2d at 1422.
101
Petherbridge et al., supra note 16.
102
FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b) (“[A] party must state with particularity the circumstances constituting
fraud or mistake. Malice, intent, knowledge, and other conditions of a person’s mind may be alleged
generally.”).
103
Star Scientific, Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 537 F.3d 1357, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
Although there is some language in Exergen Corp. v. Wal–Mart Stores, Inc., 575 F.3d 1312, 1329 n.5
(Fed. Cir. 2009), suggesting that the pleading standard is lower, the more recent decision in Pressure
Products Medical Supplies, Inc. v. Greatbatch Ltd., 599 F.3d 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2010), makes clear that
inequitable conduct cannot be even asserted (i.e., pleaded) unless the Star Scientific standard is met. See
id. at 1320 (“[T]his court has . . . requir[ed] specific and demanding showings of evidence before a
party may assert the defense of inequitable conduct.” (emphasis added)).
104
See Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 324 (2007) (“The inference that
the defendant acted with scienter need not be irrefutable . . . or even the ‘most plausible of competing
inferences . . . .’” (quoting Fidel v. Farley, 392 F.3d 220, 227 (6th Cir. 2004))).
105
See 15 U.S.C. § 78u–4(b)(2) (2006).
106
See Kevin S. Shmelzer, Comment, The Door Slammed Shut Needs to Be Reopened: Examining
the Pleading Requirements Under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 78 TEMP. L. REV. 405,
424 (2005) (“Congress . . . created a standard which was the highest of the highs . . . .”).
107
See Tol–O–Matic, Inc. v. Proma Produkt–Und Marketing Gesellschaft m.b.H., 945 F.2d 1546,
1554 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
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policy reasons: it believes that unmeritorious allegations of inequitable
conduct are too easily made.108 It has imposed this heightened burden of
proof even though it lies in great tension with the terms of the patent
statute: § 282 of the patent statute requires that a patent be presumed
valid, 109 while making no mention of a patent being presumed to be
enforceable (and the statute clearly views invalidity and unenforceability as
distinct defenses).110 Under the canon expressio unius est exclusio alterius,
the express statutory creation of a heightened burden of proof for invalidity
would implicitly preclude a heightened burden of proof for all other
defenses enumerated under § 282. 111 The Federal Circuit has never
explained how its heightened burden of proof is reconcilable with the
expressio unius canon and the Supreme Court’s closely analogous holding
in Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination
Unit that the express enumeration of heightened pleading for fraud and
mistake in Rule 9(b) implicitly precludes heightened pleading for all other
types of actions.112
Third, beyond imposing a high formal threshold at both the pleading
and merits stages, the Federal Circuit also makes it extremely difficult to
meet these elevated thresholds in practice. Not only does the Federal
Circuit formally require an extremely strong inference of intent, it
disallows the most commonsensical method of providing such an inference
in practice. A consideration of how intent is usually proved in other fraud
contexts helps explain this. Suppose that a taxpayer is accused of
committing fraudulent tax evasion by intentionally failing to file tax
returns. The IRS proves that the taxpayer always files tax returns in the
years where he has a refund and never files tax returns (or pays taxes) in
the years where he owes a tax liability.
In theory, even on this evidence, it is still possible that the taxpayer
could have innocently forgotten to file tax returns and that the convenient
timing is a simple coincidence. In every situation where intent is at issue,
there is always the classic problem: Was the perpetrator a knave or a fool?
108

Id. (“Given the ease with which a relatively routine act of patent prosecution can be portrayed as
intended to mislead or deceive, clear and convincing evidence of conduct sufficient to support an
inference of culpable intent is required.” (citing N. Telecom, Inc. v. Datapoint Corp., 908 F.2d 931, 939
(Fed. Cir. 1990))). In fairness to the Federal Circuit, there is some doctrinal support for its heightened
burden of proof. See United States v. Am. Bell Tel. Co., 167 U.S. 224, 240–41 (1897) (requiring clear
and convincing evidence when the government revokes a patent for fraud). But the Federal Circuit has
not cited American Bell to support its heightened burden of proof, and in any case, it is arguably
superseded by the statute.
109
See Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238, 2246 (2011) (holding that § 282
imposes a heightened standard of proof for invalidity).
110
See 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2006) (providing that a patent “shall be presumed valid” and then creating
separate defenses of unenforceability in subsection (1) and invalidity in subsection (2)).
111
See Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168
(1993).
112
See id.
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It is impossible to conclusively establish that the omission was not an
innocent mistake, and our hypothetical taxpayer will surely file a selfserving affidavit during litigation, asserting that he innocently forgot to file
and the timing was a simple coincidence. Nonetheless, any reasonable
person will immediately draw the inference that the taxpayer intentionally
failed to file because he failed to file only when there was something for
him to gain (i.e., avoiding the tax liability). This type of inference is both
commonsensical and common in ordinary evidence law.113
In the inequitable conduct context, however, the Federal Circuit holds
that the obvious materiality of the information concealed cannot be used to
draw an inference that the concealment was intentional.114 In other words,
the fact that the patentee concealed extremely damaging information—
material information that would clearly invalidate the patent—while
providing information that is either helpful to his cause or at least
harmless115 is considered irrelevant to determining intent.116 By this logic,
whether a taxpayer owes any taxes cannot be considered in determining
whether he intentionally failed to file a tax return, and whether a witness
has a stake in the outcome of a case cannot be considered in determining
whether he deliberately lied (perjury) or merely made an unintentional
misstatement. This is also notably inconsistent with the Federal Circuit’s
treatment of intent in other areas of patent law. For example, charges of
intentional infringement (which produces treble damages) are routinely
proven using the presumption that an infringer who knew about the patent
and clearly infringes it presumably intended the infringement, 117 and so

113

See, e.g., Bradford v. Comm’r, 796 F.2d 303, 307 (9th Cir. 1986) (noting that intent to commit
tax fraud can be inferred from: “(1) understatement of income; (2) inadequate records; (3) failure to file
tax returns; (4) implausible or inconsistent explanations of behavior; (5) concealing assets; [or] (6)
failure to cooperate with tax authorities” (citations omitted)).
114
Optium Corp. v. Emcore Corp., 603 F.3d 1313, 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“Materiality is not
evidence of intent, which must be established as a separate factual element of a discretionary ruling of
inequitable conduct.” (quoting Abbott Labs. v. Sandoz, Inc., 544 F.3d 1341, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2008))).
115
The patentee always provides information helpful to his cause because the patent application
necessarily asserts the invention to be new, useful, and nonobvious. § 115 (describing the oath an
inventor must make).
116
See Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (en
banc) (“Proving that the applicant knew of a reference, should have known of its materiality, and
decided not to submit it to the PTO does not prove specific intent to deceive.”). Prior cases that seemed
to take a contrary position, such as Bruno Independent Living Aids, Inc. v. Acorn Mobility Services,
Ltd., 394 F.3d 1348, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“[I]ntent to deceive is generally inferred from . . . a
knowing failure to disclose material information.”), have been overruled by the en banc decision in
Therasense.
117
See In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc) (willful
infringement requires the patentee to “demonstrate that th[e] objectively-defined risk . . . was either
known or so obvious that it should have been known to the accused infringer” (emphasis added)); DSU
Med. Corp. v. JMS Co., 471 F.3d 1293, 1304 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (en banc) (specific intent to induce
infringement can be proven by “showing that the alleged infringer’s actions induced infringing acts and
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intentional infringement would be found even if the infringer files a selfserving affidavit stating that he honestly believed himself to be
noninfringing. 118 In short, the Federal Circuit’s absurd evidentiary
limitation, unique to cases of inequitable conduct, removes the most
important type of evidence normally used to draw inferences of intent—the
fact that the person has a strong motive to lie because the lie will do him
some good—and makes intent to deceive practically impossible to prove
without an explicit patentee confession.119
My point in this section is not to criticize the Federal Circuit for its
doctrinal twisting; that has been done elsewhere.120 Rather, the point is that
such doctrinal twisting is motivated by a belief among judges that “real”
patentee misconduct basically never occurs.121 Given the lengths to which
the Federal Circuit has gone to hollow out inequitable conduct—which it
cannot openly abolish because of Supreme Court precedent122—the judicial
belief in patentee honesty is strong indeed.
2. The PTO: Declining Enforcement.—Although the PTO is the
supposed beneficiary of the inequitable conduct doctrine, the agency has
shown little support for it. The PTO has not conducted investigations of
inequitable conduct for more than twenty years. 123 More strikingly, the
Director of the PTO has stated that the inequitable conduct doctrine “is not
very popular” and that he hoped that courts would “dramatically draw[] it
back.”124 Similarly, in 2007, the then-Director of the PTO testified before
Congress that inequitable conduct “unfairly punish[ed]” patent applicants
that he knew or should have known his actions would induce actual infringements” (quoting Manville
Sales Corp. v. Paramount Sys., Inc., 917 F.2d 544, 554 (Fed. Cir. 1990))).
118
See, e.g., Jurgens v. CBK, Ltd., 80 F.3d 1566, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (rejecting an infringer’s
argument that it honestly believed the advice of lawyers that it was not infringing the patent).
119
Cf. Cancer Research Tech. Ltd. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 625 F.3d 724, 734 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (citing
with approval a prior case “finding intent to deceive based in part on handwritten notes of prosecution
counsel [showing] that counsel subjectively believed the undisclosed patent was material”).
120
See, e.g., McGowan, supra note 13, at 962–64.
121
See, e.g., Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1291 (“[T]his court has tried to address the proliferation of
inequitable conduct charges by raising the intent standard alone.”); Star Scientific, Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds
Tobacco Co., 537 F.3d 1357, 1365–66 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (creating an elevated standard of proof because
of concern about “strik[ing] down an entire patent where the patentee only committed minor missteps or
acted with minimal culpability or in good faith”).
122
Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 816 (1945)
(establishing the inequitable conduct defense).
123
4 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 11.03[4][b][iv] & n.66, at 11-403 (2012)
(describing how the PTO stopped enforcement of the inequitable conduct doctrine in 1988); 1095 Off.
Gaz. Pat. & Trademark Office 12, 16–17 (1988) (statement of Donald Quigg, Assistant Secretary and
Comm’r of Patents and Trademarks).
124
DIRS. ROUNDTABLE INST., A DIALOGUE WITH DAVID KAPPOS, DIRECTOR OF THE U.S. PATENT
& TRADEMARK OFFICE 34 (2011), available at http://www.directorsroundtable.com/pdf/London%20
Patent%20Program%204-4-11.pdf (statement of David Kappos, Director, U.S. Patent & Trademark
Office).
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with a “draconian penalt[y]” and recommended significant legislative
narrowing of the doctrine.125
By itself, the fact that the PTO does not enforce the doctrine would not
indicate much. The PTO lacks the institutional resources to investigate
patentee conduct and adjudicate inequitable conduct issues.126 After all, the
entire reason for requiring patentees to disclose prior art to the PTO is
because the agency lacks adequate resources to find all of the relevant prior
art by itself. It is inherently more difficult to find out about—and prove—
cases where patentees had intentionally hidden the prior art at issue. As a
matter of sensible institutional allocation of responsibility, it would make
little sense for the PTO to investigate inequitable conduct cases: someone
who has already been fooled once is not the best person to prevent a repeat.
At the same time, the fact that the supposed beneficiary of the doctrine
has shown so little support—and in fact hoped that the doctrine would be
“dramatically” scaled back and narrowed—is indicative of the
overwhelming unpopularity of the inequitable conduct doctrine. And as the
Federal Circuit has dramatically narrowed the doctrine over the years, the
PTO has shown strong support every step of the way.127
One last, perhaps obvious, point: The fact that the PTO does nothing
to investigate inequitable conduct defeats the argument that it should be
relatively immune to the selection effect and cognitive illusion that I have
described. If the PTO investigated instances of inequitable conduct, it
might then become aware of cases of serious patentee misconduct that were
not brought to the attention of courts by accused infringers during
litigation. However, because the PTO performs no investigation, it cannot
become aware of patentee frauds even if such frauds were rampant—it
must rely on the same tainted public data (i.e., litigation decisions) as
everyone else.
3. Congress: Creating Loopholes.—The belief that litigated
inequitable conduct cases are always frivolous—and that this is because
true patentee misconduct never occurs—affects not only the judges of the
Federal Circuit but also other members of the patent community who see
the same data set as the judges. 128 This includes members of Congress.
125

Patent Reform Hearing, supra note 91, at 266–67 (statement of Jon W. Dudas, Under Secretary
of Commerce for Intellectual Property and Director, U.S. Patent & Trademark Office).
126
See Duty of Disclosure, 56 Fed. Reg. 37,321, 37,323 (proposed Aug. 6, 1991) (codified in
scattered sections of 37 C.F.R. pts. 1 & 10).
127
See, e.g., Revision of the Materiality to Patentability Standard for the Duty to Disclose
Information in Patent Applications, 76 Fed. Reg. 43,631, 43,631 (proposed July 21, 2011) (to be
codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 1) (endorsing the Therasense materiality standard); Duty of Disclosure, 57 Fed.
Reg. 2021, 2024 (Jan. 17, 1992) (“The Office does not advocate any change to the Kingsdown ruling.”).
128
See, e.g., Patent Reform Hearing, supra note 91 (statement of Kathryn L. Biberstein, Senior
Vice President, General Counsel and Secretary, Chief Compliance Officer, Alkermes, Inc.) (“I do not
believe that inequitable conduct is an issue in patent prosecution today because it is rarely found to
exist.”).
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Senator Orrin Hatch, for example, has made comments that epitomize the
conventional view:
As you well know, the inequitable-conduct defense is frequently pled, rarely
proven, and always drives up the cost of litigation.
Under current law, any perceived transgression of the patent owner is
being painted as fraud. If an inequitable-conduct claim wins, a valid patent
will be held entirely void, and the infringer walks away without any liability.
There is virtually no downside for the infringer to raise this type of attack.
This is why inequitable-conduct challenges are raised in nearly every patent
case. It has become, in the words of the Federal Circuit, a “plague” on the
patent system.129

Senator Hatch’s assumptions are wrong in many respects. The result
of inequitable conduct is not always that a “valid” patent is held entirely
void—tellingly, he appears to assume that no invalid patents are ever
obtained through patentee fraud. And an infringer faces the same
“downsides” to raising an inequitable conduct defense as to raise any other
defense, such as invalidity or noninfringement: it requires attorneys’ fees
and litigation costs to seriously litigate any defense to patent infringement,
and the investigatory costs are especially high when the patentee has
intentionally concealed relevant evidence. Finally, Senator Hatch’s
observation that inequitable conduct is “frequently pled” while “rarely
proven” invokes the common argument that allegations of patentee
dishonesty are generally frivolous. 130 Contrary to this implicit argument,
however, my analysis suggests that this phenomenon may in fact indicate
that many meritorious inequitable conduct cases are being abandoned
precisely because the fraud is so serious that the patent is invalid.
Again, my point here is not to pick on Senator Hatch’s comments as
wrong but to show that they represent the conventional wisdom, which has
arisen because of the selection effect. The clear assumption underlying his
remarks is that Senator Hatch believes patentees are never (or at least very
rarely) dishonest enough to obtain invalid patents by fraud. Given this
erroneous but widely shared premise, it logically follows that inequitable
conduct doctrine serves no other purpose than to allow evil infringers to
“walk[] away without any liability” while punishing innocent and worthy
patentees.131
Belief in this conventional wisdom amongst members of Congress has
led to legislation to narrow the inequitable conduct doctrine. Section 12 of
the Leahy–Smith America Invents Act creates a new “supplemental
129

Hatch, supra note 5, at 515–16 (footnotes omitted).
See supra text accompanying notes 83–91.
131
Hatch, supra note 5, at 516; cf. People v. Defore, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (N.Y. 1926) (criticizing the
Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule as saying “[t]he criminal is to go free because the constable has
blundered”).
130
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examination” procedure, where a patent owner may—at any time after the
patent is issued—ask the PTO to conduct a supplemental examination of
the patent to consider information that was previously concealed from the
PTO. 132 The Act then provides that “[a] patent shall not be held
unenforceable on the basis of conduct relating to information that had not
been considered, was inadequately considered, or was incorrect in a prior
examination of the patent if the information was considered, reconsidered,
or corrected during a supplemental examination of the patent.”133 As one
commentator has described, this amounts to an “amnesty” program for
dishonest patentees: So long as a patentee invokes the supplemental
examination procedure and confesses to a prior deception, the prior
deception is unconditionally forgiven and cannot thereafter form the basis
of an inequitable conduct charge.134
The statute does have two limitations on the amnesty. First, the
amnesty does not apply to any patentee-initiated suits that are launched
before the conclusion of supplemental examination proceedings.135 In other
words, if a patent owner seeks the protection of the amnesty, he must wait
for the supplemental examination to conclude before filing an infringement
suit. Second, the amnesty does not apply to inequitable conduct allegations
that are fully pleaded before the filing of a supplemental examination
request. 136 That is, a patentee cannot wait and seek the supplemental
examination amnesty only after the writing is on the wall; he must do so
(slightly) earlier.137
But these are minor qualifications. The more important point is that, as
a general matter, the new legislation destroys any incentive for patentees to
honestly disclose information upfront.138 In Part I.E.1, I discussed the fact
that, in the middle portion of the figure—where a patent is only partially
invalid—there is some deterrence effect from rendering the entire patent
unenforceable. Under the new legislation, even this limited deterrence
effect is eliminated. Suppose our patentee who claims a pencil and an
132

See Leahy–Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 12(a), 125 Stat. 284, 325–26
(2011) (codified at 35 U.S.C.A. § 257(c)(1) (West Supp. 2013)).
133
Id. 125 Stat. at 326.
134
See Jason Rantanen & Lee Petherbridge, Toward a System of Invention Registration: The
Leahy–Smith America Invents Act, 110 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 24, 25 (2011) (calling the
provision “a patent amnesty program”).
135
§ 12, 125 Stat. at 326 (codified at 35 U.S.C.A § 257(c)(2)).
136
Id.
137
The statute requires an inequitable conduct charge to be “pled with particularity” before it
forecloses a supplemental examination amnesty. Id. Given the Federal Circuit’s very high pleading
burden, see supra text accompanying notes 102–06, a fully pleaded inequitable conduct charge can be
aptly said to be writing on the wall.
138
See Rantanen & Petherbridge, supra note 134, at 25–26 (explaining that the two qualifications
“are largely within the control of the patentee, and thus are not likely to offer an effective
counterincentive”).
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eraser discovers prior art showing a pencil in the public domain.
Previously, a risk averse patentee might disclose the prior art pencil to
avoid losing the valid claim to the eraser. Now, however, there is no
incentive to disclose the prior art pencil unless and until its discovery by a
third party is imminent. 139 The new legislation therefore exacerbates the
underdeterrence problem. Once again, the universal unpopularity of
inequitable conduct—based on the unsubstantiated belief in intrinsic
patentee honesty—leads to doctrinal changes that create an incentive for
dishonesty.
III. THE EFFECT OF ADJUSTING LIABILITY STANDARDS
Thus far, my analysis has considered only the effect of the
unenforceability penalty, with the implicit assumption that it would always
be applied. One seemingly obvious response is that surely the
unenforceability penalty would not be applied to the low-culpability cases.
This response jumps the gun in the sense that the reason that the penalty
should not be applied in low-culpability cases is that it induces
overdeterrence, and to reach this conclusion first requires a consideration of
what would happen if the penalty were applied. Moreover, the response is
not quite accurate. In the conventional debate over inequitable conduct, the
most commonly contested issue is the standard for liability, i.e., the degree
of culpability that should be required before the unenforceability penalty
attaches. This Part explores the effects of varying the liability standard. As
shall be seen, the results are quite different from the conventional
understanding.
A. The Debate over Liability Standards
In the conventional debate over inequitable conduct, there is a
common theory on the relationship between liability standards and
deterrence effects. Specifically, the theory is that narrow liability produces
low deterrence, and broad liability produces high deterrence. This theory is
implicit in virtually all writing about inequitable conduct.
For example, as described previously, there is an almost universal
belief in the patent community that inequitable conduct produces
overdeterrence. Reflecting the common theory, there is then a broad
consensus in the patent community that liability standards should be
narrowed. Both the majority and the dissent in Therasense agreed that
inequitable conduct should be narrowed from the prior baseline. The
majority, believing inequitable conduct to produce overdeterrence, adopted
139

Id. One other limitation on invoking supplemental examination is the PTO fee for the
procedure. Although it is quite large in absolute terms ($16,500), the sum is nonetheless trivial in
comparison to the increased value of an undeserved patent and to the patentee’s other litigation costs.
See Setting and Adjusting Patent Fees, 78 Fed. Reg. 4212, 4232 (Jan. 18, 2013) (to be codified at 37
C.F.R. § 1.20) (setting fee for supplemental examination).
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a very narrow liability rule. Specifically, it held that inequitable conduct
could be found only if honest disclosure would have invalidated the
patent.140 This is known as the “but-for” standard and it is usually regarded
as the most stringent standard possible.141
The dissent’s position was that the majority narrowed liability too far,
to the point where inequitable conduct would now produce
underdeterrence:
[T]he majority’s new test . . . does not merely reform the doctrine of
inequitable conduct, but comes close to abolishing it altogether. I
respectfully dissent from that aspect of the court’s decision.
....
. . . If a failure to disclose constitutes inequitable conduct only when a
proper disclosure would result in rejection of a claim, there will be little
incentive for applicants to be candid with the PTO, because in most
instances the sanction of inequitable conduct will apply only if the claims
that issue are invalid anyway.142

This is, at first blush, rather similar to my analysis in Part I. But it is
different in two ways. First, the dissent believed the problem arose from the
majority narrowing liability too much, whereas Part I shows that the
underdeterrence effect occurs even with absolute liability. 143 Second, the
dissent accordingly believed that underdeterrence can be prevented or
cured by adopting a broader liability rule—specifically, it advocated a rule
where inequitable conduct could be found if a patentee violates PTO
disclosure requirements, even if the concealed information is harmless and
the patent is valid. But, as this Part will show, this is the wrong solution.
Expanding liability does not cure the underdeterrence problem. The
common theory about the relationship between liability standards and
deterrence effects is wrong, or at least is overly simplistic.
The following discussion will demonstrate this counterintuitive
proposition in more detail. To state the reason quickly, however, lowering
the liability standard (i.e., broadening liability) and levying the
unenforceability penalty on relatively innocent patentees will not provide
deterrence for the highly culpable patentees because a highly culpable
patentee like Andy already knows he will be found 100% liable if the true
facts are ever discovered. He still has no incentive for honest disclosure
because even certain liability brings no deterrence when the
140

See Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1291 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (en
banc) (defining the standard as: “the PTO would not have allowed a claim had it been aware of the
undisclosed prior art”).
141
See Scott D. Anderson, Comment, Inequitable Conduct: Persistent Problems and Recommended
Resolutions, 82 MARQ. L. REV. 845, 854 n.65 (1999).
142
Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1304–05 (Bryson, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
143
See supra note 51 (noting that the model assumes liability is found).
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unenforceability “penalty” is superfluous. All the Therasense dissenters’
solution would do is create more examples of draconian overpunishment on
people like Betty, which would spark even more criticism and calls for
abolishing the inequitable conduct doctrine entirely. 144 In this way, the
dissenters’ “solution” is self-defeating.
B. A Model of Unenforceability with Liability Thresholds
As discussed in Part I.D, if the unenforceability penalty is applied in
all cases, then the result is an upside-down punishment structure. This can
be conceptualized as the lowest (and broadest) liability standard—in every
case the patentee is found liable for inequitable conduct. Figure 1, which
shows the basic model, is reproduced below. For clarity, I have added
shading to represent the over- and underdeterrence effects.
FIGURE 1.1: THE BASIC MODEL OF THE UNENFORCEABILITY PENALTY

Deterrence
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Overdeterrence
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Deterrence
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Deterrence

Culpability

As described previously, the upside-down nature of the
unenforceability penalty creates two problems: on the left side of the
diagram, there is overdeterrence, while on the right side of the diagram,
there is underdeterrence. Both effects get more pronounced as we go
towards the extremes. The result is that patentees conceal the most
damaging information (because of underdeterrence), while they massively
overdisclose the most trivial information (because of overdeterrence).

144

See, e.g., NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST
CENTURY 123 (Stephen A. Merrill et al. eds., 2004) (recommending abolition); Lynch, supra note 7, at
9 (same).
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Imposing a liability threshold means that cases with lower culpability
(left of the threshold) incur no penalty. Figure 2 illustrates the effect this
has on the over- and underdeterrence problems:
FIGURE 2: IMPOSING A LIABILITY THRESHOLD
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As can be seen, the liability threshold removes most of the
overdeterrence effect seen in Figure 1. The underdeterrence effect on the
right side of the diagram remains. Perhaps more counterintuitively, there is
now an underdeterrence effect on the left side of the diagram.
What this represents is patent applicants taking too few precautions
against minor errors. For example, a rule that says misspelled citizenship
will never be punished means that applicants have no incentive to check
their citizenship statements. Although this is better than imposing
draconian overpunishment and having applicants take grossly excessive
precautions against such minor errors, having patent applicants take no
precautions at all is still a social cost—patent applications riddled with
typos and other minor mistakes are still undesirable. Thus, in Figure 2,
there is an area of underdeterrence, but this area is smaller than the area of
overdeterrence seen in Figure 1 (in both cases I am speaking only of the
left side of the diagram).
Now consider the right side of Figure 2. This represents the cases
where the patent is likely invalid—at the extreme, it is a case like Andy’s.
And it represents the problem the dissenters in Therasense identified. The
dissenters then argued that expanding liability will solve this problem. To
see if this is correct, consider Figure 3, which illustrates the effect of
expanding liability:
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FIGURE 3: LOWERING THE LIABILITY THRESHOLD
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As can be seen, the right portion of the diagram, representing patentees
who hide highly damaging, likely invalidating information from the PTO,
is utterly unaffected by lowering the liability threshold. Thus, contrary to
the common intuitive belief, expanding inequitable conduct liability does
not increase deterrence against highly culpable fraud on the PTO. A highly
culpable patentee is underdeterred not because he expects to escape
liability, but because the penalty is insufficient even when liability is
imposed. Expanding liability thus does not fix the problem.
The only effect of lowering the liability standard is to change the leftmiddle portion of the diagram, where we switch from underdeterrence to
overdeterrence. Most strikingly, the point where the liability rule is initially
satisfied (the sharp spike) now produces a great deal of overdeterrence.
This would represent a case similar to Betty’s—a fairly minor error (e.g.,
misstated citizenship) that almost certainly would not invalidate the patent
even if revealed, but that a court might deem a violation of statutory
disclosure requirements.145 Imposing the unenforceability penalty in such a
case exacerbates the upside-down effect, since it creates severe
overdeterrence without reducing the worst cases of underdeterrence on the
right side of the diagram. In this way, the dissenters’ solution is both wrong
and self-defeating: It does nothing to solve the problem it seeks to solve, it
creates additional problems, and those additional problems generate
backlash against the rule by falling on highly visible and politically
sympathetic victims.
145

See 35 U.S.C. § 115 (2006) (specifically requiring citizenship to be disclosed).
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What about the Therasense majority, which wants to narrow liability?
Raising the liability threshold would simply take us back to Figure 2, which
reduces the overdeterrence effect but does not address the underdeterrence
problem. This is in one sense better (compared to Figure 3 and Figure 1),
but it is still distinctly subpar as a solution. Furthermore, raising the
liability threshold too far can be highly problematic. Beyond the center
point of the diagram, there is no overdeterrence effect to reduce, and thus it
becomes purely an increase in underdeterrence with no offsetting benefit.146
The big problem with the conventional focus on liability thresholds is
that the right half of the diagram always has underdeterrence. No matter
what rule we set for the liability threshold, a patentee like Andy will always
be better off lying to the PTO. The only effect of varying the liability
threshold is to affect incentives on the left side of the diagram. This is not
trivial—the liability rule still matters—but it is an incomplete solution.
Unless there is some reason to believe high-culpability cases simply do not
occur,147 then the conventional focus on liability rules ignores half of the
problem. A proper solution to the underdeterrence problem requires
adjusting the remedy,148 a solution I will discuss in more detail in Part IV.
C. Expanding the Model with Probabilistic Liability
An objection to the model in section B might be that a liability
threshold is too simplistic. Implicit in that model is an assumption that
courts determine culpability with a great deal of consistency: If a patentee
falls above the threshold, even by a tiny amount, the patent will be held
unenforceable in every such case, while if a patentee falls below the
threshold, no penalty will be applied. In real life, courts are not so
consistent.149 However, expanding the model does not greatly change the
analysis.
Rather than imposing a bright-line threshold, a more realistic model
would be to suppose that the chance of being found liable increases with
the culpability but is never quite 0% or 100%. That is, an innocent patentee
like Betty is unlikely to be found liable but still has some chance due to the
146

There is, in theory, an “optimal” liability threshold where the marginal overdeterrence effect
equals the marginal underdeterrence effect. My point is therefore not that the liability rule has no effect,
nor that narrow liability is always better. My point is that reforming the liability rule is a highly
incomplete solution, with the best result still having significant over- and underdeterrence effects.
147
To be sure, many judges and commentators do in fact believe that high-culpability cases never
occur, which may explain why the debate has focused on the liability rule. But Part II explains why this
assumption is unfounded.
148
Contra Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (en
banc) (Bryson, J., dissenting) (arguing for expanding liability as the solution); Norton v. Curtiss, 433
F.2d 779, 795 (C.C.P.A. 1970) (same).
149
See Thomas L. Irving et al., The Evolution of Intent: A Review of Patent Law Cases Invoking
the Doctrine of Inequitable Conduct from Precision to Exergen, 35 U. DAYTON L. REV. 303, 319–20
(2010) (arguing that inequitable conduct liability determinations are “panel-dependent”).
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vagaries of the trial process. Similarly, a patentee like Andy is very likely
to be found liable, but the chance is not 100%, again because of the
vagaries of the trial process. Figure 4 depicts how this assumption—of a
variable chance of being found liable—affects the result:
FIGURE 4: PROBABILISTIC LIABILITY
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In Figure 4, the probability of being found liable for inequitable
conduct increases in a straight line with increasing culpability. The patentee
with no culpability has a 10% chance of being found liable, while the
patentee with the highest culpability has a 90% chance of being found
liable, with intermediately culpable patentees having correspondingly
intermediate chances of being found liable (e.g., a patentee that is 60%
culpable has a 58% chance of being found liable).
Two things are notable about this model. First, the right-hand side is
once again completely unaffected—it still shows a severe and pervasive
underdeterrence problem. The better news, however, is that the left side is
reasonably efficient: there is a reasonable correlation where increasing
culpability results in increasing deterrence, though still with some overand underdeterrence effects. This reasonably good outcome arises because
the high severity of the penalty is being offset by the low probability of
being found liable. For example, although a 5% culpable patentee would
face a very severe penalty (losing a 95% valid patent), that relatively
innocent patentee only faces a 14% chance of liability and thus is only
slightly overdeterred.
What Figure 4 suggests is that if we can adjust the probability of being
found liable just right, so that it exactly offsets the high penalty, then it is
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possible to achieve optimal deterrence on the left side of the diagram.
Figure 5 illustrates this possibility:
FIGURE 5: THE OPTIMAL PROBABILISTIC LIABILITY RULE
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This is the best outcome that can be achieved through manipulation of
the liability rule. On the left half of the diagram, the overdeterrence effect
is exactly offset by manipulating the probability of being found liable,
resulting in the perfect amount of deterrence. However, once we pass the
center point, even a 100% chance of liability—which is not achievable in
reality because we can never eliminate the possibility of evasion—will not
result in sufficient deterrence because the declining severity of punishment
dominates the deterrence effect. In other words, beyond the center point, it
becomes quite likely that the patent is invalid anyway, so the prospect of a
meaningless superfluous penalty ceases to be a sufficient threat. The sum
of the situation is that, even with perfect calibration of the liability rule, the
underdeterrence problem cannot be solved. This is the same whether we
adopt a simplistic liability threshold or a more sophisticated probabilistic
liability rule.
Moreover, it should be noted that actually implementing the type of
probabilistic calibration contemplated by Figure 5 would be extremely
demanding on courts. In order to achieve the optimal result, courts must be
able to determine the amount of culpability and the severity of the
punishment with a high degree of precision; they must then manipulate the
probability of finding liability (including not only the win rate in cases
actually brought to litigation but also the probability of having litigation in
the first place) to exactly offset the severe punishment. Achieving this
degree of precision will be difficult, especially towards the left extreme
1282
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where the severity of the punishment (when imposed) is very high and thus
even slight changes in the probability of imposing such punishment will
have large effects. Not only is achieving such precision difficult, it also
offends a basic moral premise of our legal system that similar cases should
receive similar outcomes.150 For example, in Figure 5, a relatively innocent
patentee with 5% culpability will receive very severe punishment when
liability is imposed, and therefore courts must impose such liability only
very occasionally (to be precise, 5.263% of the time). This is equivalent to
saying that one unlucky patentee out of approximately twenty similarly
situated patentees must get randomly zapped by a harsh penalty to provide
optimal deterrence to others—a situation that is difficult to design
administratively and not all that desirable from a moral viewpoint even if it
were feasible.151 If this perfect probabilistic liability rule cannot realistically
be achieved, then existing reform efforts that are focused on tinkering with
the liability standard have even lower payoffs than the incomplete solution
illustrated in Figure 5.
IV. A PROPOSED SOLUTION: ADJUSTING REMEDIES
A. Generalizing the Problem: The Paradox of Fraud
Before proceeding to my proposed solution, it is useful to note that the
problem analyzed here is not unique to patent law. The core problem
underlying the inequitable conduct doctrine can be termed the “paradox of
fraud”: by the time a fraud charge can be litigated, the previously concealed
truth will necessarily have been exposed, and once the truth is exposed
there will usually be an independent legal remedy that provides full
restitution.152 A consideration of how other areas of law deal with this same
problem illuminates why the inequitable conduct solution has thus far
proven a failure.
Take contract law. Suppose a builder contracts with a homeowner to
build a house using Reading pipes.153 The builder’s employee inadvertently
substitutes cheaper Cohoes pipes, which creates a breach of the contract.
Once the builder discovers this error, however, the builder decides to lie

150

See, e.g., Henry J. Friendly, Indiscretion About Discretion, 31 EMORY L.J. 747, 758 (1982)
(“[T]he most basic principle of jurisprudence [is] that ‘we must act alike in all cases of like nature.’”
(quoting Ward v. James, [1966] 1 Q.B. 273, 294 (C.A.))).
151
Cf. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 309 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring) (arguing that
randomly imposing punishment is impermissible “in the same way that being struck by lightning is
cruel and unusual”).
152
See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 6.15 (7th ed. 2007) (“If a tort is
concealed . . . , punitive damages or a criminal penalty must be added to the defendant’s profit or the
victim’s loss to provide adequate deterrence.”).
153
This hypothetical is based on Jacob & Youngs, Inc. v. Kent, 129 N.E. 889 (N.Y. 1921).
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and tell the homeowner that he installed Reading pipes rather than to
disclose the truth and pay the difference in value.
It is immediately apparent that the fraud paradox applies here as well:
By the time the homeowner discovers that the pipes are really Cohoes
pipes, he can sue the builder for breach of contract. The contract remedy is
fully restitutionary—that is, it places the homeowner in the same position
as if the builder had fully complied with his legal duty in the first place.154
If the fraud remedy were also merely restitutionary, it would be superfluous
and provide no deterrent against the builder choosing to lie after he
discovers the employee’s inadvertent error. 155 But clearly there is social
value in deterring the cover-up lie over and above the initial breach of
contract. It is for this reason that fraud allows punitive damages,156 whereas
breach of contract is only restitutionary. 157 The potential for punitive
damages creates deterrence over and above the breach of contract claim,
solving the fraud paradox.
In comparison to contract law’s solution to the fraud paradox, patent
law falls short on three fronts. First, the invalidity remedy is not fully
restitutionary in the way that a breach of contract remedy is. That is, ex
post judicial invalidation does not place a patentee who obtained an invalid
patent in the same position as if the patent never issued because the
patentee is not required to disgorge monopoly profits made during the
period between the patent’s issuance and its judicial invalidation. 158 Nor
does a finding of inequitable conduct and the application of the
unenforceability remedy have this effect. The result is that applicants have
a strong incentive to apply for patents regardless of the underlying merits
of their inventions because any mistake by the PTO will accrue to the
applicant’s benefit in the form of interim monopoly profits. As another
comparison, imagine a doctrine that said any mistaken interim payments by
the Social Security Administration were the recipient’s to keep, even after
the mistake is discovered, and the only effect of discovery is to terminate
future undeserved payments. The result would surely be a flood of
undeserving applications—some outright fraudulent; some merely hoping

154

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 344(a), at 102 (1981) (purpose of contract
remedies is to put the victim “in as good a position as he would have been in had the contract been
performed”).
155
Cf. George J. Stigler, The Optimum Enforcement of Laws, 78 J. POL. ECON. 526, 527–28 (1970)
(“If the thief has his hand cut off for taking five dollars, he had just as well take $5,000.”).
156
See POSNER, supra note 152; see, e.g., Etter v. Von Sternberg, 244 S.W.2d 321, 324 (Tex. App.
1951) (affirming punitive damages against a party that fraudulently concealed a breach of contract).
157
See generally 11 JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 59.2, at 550 (rev. ed. 2005)
(“As a general rule, punitive damages are not recoverable for breach of contract . . . .”); see also id. at
552 (noting that in cases “falling within the field of tort,” such as for fraud, there is an exception to the
general rule that damages should be merely restitutionary).
158
See Mark A. Lemley, Ignoring Patents, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REV 19, 28.
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for a bigger payday than deserved—all hoping for such “lucky” mistakes.159
Not surprisingly, there is in fact a flood of dubious patent applications,160
which are often analogized to lottery tickets,161 and which clog the PTO.162
At a minimum, therefore, a sensible reform for patent doctrine would be to
make the default invalidity remedy fully restitutionary, even in the absence
of intentional concealment.163
Second, the unenforceability remedy does not create marginal
deterrence in the same manner as punitive damages. Punitive damages
create marginal punishment and deterrence in that they go beyond the
remedy for breach of contract and place the dishonest builder in a worse
position than if he had been honest initially. This creates an incentive for
the builder to be honest upon discovery of the initial inadvertent error (of
the employee using Cohoes pipes). The super-restitutionary remedy also
creates an incentive for the homeowner to bring the intentional fraud to
light even after prevailing on a strict liability breach of contract claim in
order to gain the punitive damages. 164 In contrast, the unenforceability
remedy is superfluous in light of the invalidity remedy, which means there
is no additional punishment for dishonesty and little incentive for an
accused infringer to bring the fraud to light afterwards. The obvious
solution in light of this comparison is to ensure that the inequitable conduct
remedy provides something over and above the invalidity remedy so that a
dishonest patentee is placed in a worse position than if he had been honest
upfront.
The third difference is that, as described in Part II.C.1, an accused
infringer who seeks to prove inequitable conduct in patent litigation faces a
far higher burden than an ordinary plaintiff seeking to prove fraud in
contract litigation. This point is somewhat tangential to the point of this
Article because, as demonstrated in Part III, changing the liability standard
159

Cf. 42 U.S.C. § 404(a) (2006) (provision for Social Security Administration to recover mistaken
overpayments).
160
See John R. Thomas, Collusion and Collective Action in the Patent System: A Proposal for
Patent Bounties, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 305, 318–21 (describing a “patent quality crisis”); see also FED.
TRADE COMM’N, supra note 73, exec. summ., at 5 (stating that low quality patents “[a]re a [s]ignificant
[c]ompetitive [c]oncern”).
161
See, e.g., Dennis D. Crouch, The Patent Lottery: Exploiting Behavioral Economics for the
Common Good, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 141, 149–51 (2008).
162
See John R. Allison & Emerson H. Tiller, The Business Method Patent Myth, 18 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 987, 1065 (2003) (“[T]here have been dramatic increases in the number of patent
applications in recent years . . . .”).
163
Another way of thinking about this is that a patentee who obtained an invalid patent has
breached his contract with society, since he did not in fact supply a new, useful, and nonobvious
invention as promised. See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 150–51
(1989) (analogizing patents to a “bargain”). Society should then be entitled to rescission, including a
disgorgement of interim payments.
164
See Mathias v. Accor Econ. Lodging, Inc., 347 F.3d 672, 677 (7th Cir. 2003) (Posner, J.)
(noting that one reason for awarding punitive damages is to provide an incentive to sue).

1285

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

will not fundamentally solve the upside-down-incentives problem, and a
better solution is to fix the remedy. But a liability standard that is so high
that inequitable conduct is de facto impossible to prove will still present a
problem, since no remedy will suffice to deter misconduct if the penalty is
never applied. The Federal Circuit is not yet at the point of literally never
finding inequitable conduct to be proven, but it comes sufficiently close to
this extreme that it is a concern worth raising.165
B. Punitive Fines as a Solution
The usual solution to the fraud problem is some kind of punitive
sanction. As shown previously, the unenforceability remedy does not work
as a punitive sanction because its interaction with invalidity produces
upside-down marginal deterrence. A much more direct solution is to
abandon the unenforceability remedy and impose direct monetary fines
instead.166 Because inequitable conduct and the unenforceability remedy are
both judge-made doctrines, this requires only a small doctrinal change—
small, at least, in comparison to abolishing inequitable conduct altogether,
as is often proposed.167 And although I call this monetary penalty a “fine”—
which usually denotes something paid to the government—it is important
that this fine be made at least partly payable to the accused infringer in
order to provide an incentive for accused infringers to litigate the issue.168
In advocating the abolition of the unenforceability remedy, I do not
mean to endorse a moral proposition that highly culpable patentees who
fraudulently obtain invalid patents from the PTO ought to be able to
enforce those patents, so long as they pay the proposed fine. That is neither
the motivation nor the likely effect of my proposal. Rather, the reason I
advocate abolishing the unenforceability penalty is that it is superfluous in
cases of highly culpable patentee misconduct—the patent would already be
invalidated when the truth came to light. The point of a punitive remedy is
to punish the dishonesty by imposing punishment over and above the result
that would occur but for the dishonest conduct. The failure to impose this
additional loss is what makes the unenforceability remedy a failure as a
solution to the fraud paradox.

165

See supra text accompanying notes 114–19. Since its decision in Therasense, the Federal
Circuit has issued only one published decision upholding a finding of inequitable conduct. Aventis
Pharma S.A. v. Hospira, Inc., 675 F.3d 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (finding patent both invalid and
unenforceable).
166
But cf. Cotropia, supra note 6, at 775 (considering a monetary fine but arguing that unenforceability
produces better tailoring).
167
See, e.g., NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., supra note 144; Lynch, supra note
7, at 9.
168
Cf. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(1)–(2) (2006) (providing between 15% and 30% of the recovery to
private plaintiffs as an incentive to expose fraudulent claims).
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Conversely, it should also be noted that, in cases where some
misstatement occurs but the patent is not otherwise invalid (the left side of
the diagram), a small fine can and should be assessed even while leaving
the patentee with a valid and enforceable patent. This is
because even minor errors should receive some deterrence169—just not the
disproportionate penalty of losing an otherwise valid patent.
The key question is how the fine should be calculated. There is a vast
law and economics literature on setting the right amount of punitive fines
and damages.170 In short, a remedy for misconduct should do two things:
(1) impose restitution by restoring the world to the state it would have been
in if the misconduct had not occurred and (2) punish the misconduct by
placing the wrongdoer in a worse state than what would have been, in
proportion to the ex ante likelihood of evasion, to deter future incentives
for misconduct.171
1. The Baseline: Restoring the “But for” State.—The typical starting
point for legal remedies is to restore the world to where it would have been
had the misconduct not occurred. 172 One might think that the invalidity
remedy—by invalidating an erroneously issued patent while maintaining a
properly valid patent—would suffice for this purpose. And indeed, the
invalidity remedy does fulfill part of this function. However, it fails to do
so completely because the invalidity remedy does not require patentee
disgorgement of interim monopoly profits.173
Where a patentee misstatement causes a wholly invalid patent to
issue—which in a but-for world would never have issued—a proper
restitutionary remedy must remove all the future and past effects of the
patent. The fact that the patent would be independently invalidated once the
truth comes to light does remove the future effects of the patent, so no
further action is needed on that front. However, in order to redress the past
effect of the patent, a disgorgement remedy is required.174 Thus, just as in
other fraud contexts, a patentee who obtained an invalid patent through
fraud should be required to repay all the ill-gotten monopoly profits made
during the interim.175
Where a patentee misstatement causes a partially invalid patent to
issue, the analysis is largely the same. The fact that the patent would be
169

See supra Figure 2.
See, e.g., A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis,
111 HARV. L. REV. 869 (1998).
171
See id. at 887–89.
172
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 51(4), at 203 (2011)
(“The object of restitution . . . is to eliminate profit from wrongdoing . . . .”).
173
See Lemley, supra note 158.
174
See Pruitt, supra note 49 (arguing for disgorgement remedy).
175
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 51(4), at 203 (“[T]he
unjust enrichment of a conscious wrongdoer . . . is the net profit attributable to the underlying wrong.”).
170
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partially invalidated removes the future effect of the excessive scope
received. A disgorgement remedy should also be imposed for the excess
profits made over and above what a properly issued patent would have
earned. To be sure, assessing the difference between the actual monopoly
profits gained under the improperly enlarged patent vis-à-vis the
hypothetical monopoly profits that would have been earned under a
properly issued patent may be difficult as a practical matter—I will discuss
the assessment problem in Part IV.C.1—but conceptually the baseline is
quite clear.
Where a patentee misstatement does not cause an invalid patent to
issue but causes some other benefit to the patentee (e.g., allows the patentee
to pay lower PTO fees), the result is that the patent should not be
invalidated.176 Rather, a restoration of the but-for state would simply entail
removing the benefit, such as by paying the PTO fee at the proper rate (plus
interest).
Most obviously, where a patentee misstatement had no effect at all,
this prong of the test would have no application. A somewhat tricky
problem, which I will address in the next prong, deals with attempts at
fraud that prove immaterial ex post, but which might nonetheless need
some deterrence ex ante.
2. The Punishment: Accounting for the Chance of Evasion.—Even
after applying a restitutionary remedy, there would be insufficient
deterrence of fraud. If the remedy were limited to restitution, the patentee
would reason thus: “If I am dishonest and succeed, I will gain a benefit,
while if I fail, I would only be placed in the same position as if I were
honest to begin with, and so I am strictly better off being dishonest.”177
What is needed is a punishment that offsets this expected gain (in cases
where evasion is successful) with an expected loss (in cases where the
wrongdoer is caught).178
For example, if a dishonest patentee has a 75% chance of evading
detection and expects to gain $100 in those cases where he is not caught,
then in the 25% of cases where he is caught, he must be made to pay a
punitive fine of $300 in addition to disgorging the $100 gain. This achieves
176

Cf. Nilssen v. Osram Sylvania, Inc., 504 F.3d 1223, 1230–32 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (holding a patent
unenforceable for inequitable conduct in falsely claiming small-entity status).
177
Patent courts are acutely sensitive to this problem when the victim is a patentee and the
wrongdoer is an infringer. See Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, Inc., 575 F.2d 1152, 1158
(6th Cir. 1978) (opining that infringement damages must be more than restitutionary since otherwise an
“infringer would have nothing to lose, and everything to gain”); Stickle v. Heublein, Inc., 716 F.2d
1550, 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (endorsing Panduit). Yet they are mysteriously blind to it when the
alignment is reversed.
178
See Mathias v. Accor Econ. Lodging, Inc., 347 F.3d 672, 677 (7th Cir. 2003) (“If a tortfeasor is
‘caught’ only half the time he commits torts, then when he is caught he should be punished twice as
heavily in order to make up for the times he gets away.”).
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optimal ex ante deterrence because the total expected gain from dishonesty,
after accounting for the deterrence value of punishment, is zero. Stated
algebraically:

pe G  (1  pe ) F  0
where
pe is the probability of evading detection and liability,
G is the anticipated gain in cases where evasion is successful, and
F is the amount of punitive fine required.
Reworking the equation produces this formula for calculating the fine:

F

pe G
1  pe

Applied to the example above, pe would equal 0.75, (1 – pe) would equal
0.25, and G would equal $100, resulting in an F of $300.
As a general approximation, the value of the anticipated gain in cases
of successful evasion (G) can be proxied by the actual gain of the patentee.
If the patentee in fact received an invalid patent worth $100 through his
fraud, then it can usually be assumed that $100 was what he anticipated.
This is because, over the long run, patentee expectations would be formed
based on actual results.179 In the usual case, therefore, courts should assess
the fine by taking the value of the ill-gotten patent (or the ill-gotten portion
of a partially invalid patent), and multiplying that value by an appropriate
multiplier to account for the chance of evasion.
The one complication is situations where the patentee’s anticipated
gain clearly differs from the actual gain. For example, a patentee may
mistakenly believe his pending patent to be invalid and thereby use
deceptive tactics to obtain it, with the monopoly being worth $100. It may
emerge afterwards that the patent was in fact perfectly valid and would
have issued even without the deceptive tactics, and so the actual gain from
the lie is $0. Nonetheless, it remains important to punish the patentee for
the attempted fraud—to deter future patentees when they expect an illicit
gain of $100—but it is more difficult to calibrate the penalty as an
administrative matter. 180 A patentee’s actual gain is objective and thus
relatively feasible for a court to ascertain; a patentee’s anticipated gain is

179

The assumption that individuals form and adjust expectations in reaction to actual results is
quite standard in the decisionmaking literature. See, e.g., Avery Katz, The Strategic Structure of Offer
and Acceptance: Game Theory and the Law of Contract Formation, 89 MICH. L. REV. 215, 283–84
(1990).
180
See generally Steven Shavell, Deterrence and the Punishment of Attempts, 19 J. LEGAL STUD.
435 (1990) (outlining the deterrence rationale for punishing attempts that ultimately produce no harm).
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subjective and thus more difficult to reliably determine.181 Thus, while it is
important to punish attempts at intentional misconduct—and the law
usually does punish attempts—courts should generally refrain from
punishing an immaterial misstatement unless the evidence of intent is very
clear. 182 The rationale for this hesitation is not based on moral aversion;
rather it is that punishing attempts entails higher administrative costs for
courts, since they must undertake the difficult (and thus costly) task of
discerning a patentee’s subjective expected gain and levy an appropriate
multiple as a fine.
At a bottom-line level, therefore, I agree with the prevailing doctrine
that evidence of intent should be very clear before imposing liability183 in
cases where the patent is completely valid and the patentee accrues no
other gains from the misstatement (e.g., lowered PTO fees). However, the
doctrine is quite wrong to impose a similarly demanding standard for intent
even in cases where the patent is invalid, 184 since making inequitable
conduct de facto impossible to prove in all cases results in obvious
problems of underdeterrence.
3. The Liability Standard: An Administrative Cost Saver.—If we
adopt the penalty structure that I advocate, what should the liability rule be
for inequitable conduct? In other words, what should the standards be for
intent and materiality? My argument is that, if we can calibrate the penalty
correctly, liability should be found in almost all cases where the patentee
makes any kind of error that creates measurable benefit to the patentee (or
measurable harm to the PTO).
Let me start by illustrating this argument with an example. Suppose
the patentee makes a minor typographical error in his address. There is
tremendous resistance to imposing inequitable conduct liability in this type
of case because the current unenforceability remedy will impose very
severe punishment by removing an otherwise valid patent.185 But it is not
181

Cf. David D. Friedman, Impossibility, Subjective Probability, and Punishment for Attempts,
20 J. LEGAL STUD. 179 (1991) (arguing that subjective assessments of the offender are more important).
182
See Shavell, supra note 180, at 449 (“[T]he presence of ‘intent’ is generally a prerequisite for
punishment and, in particular, for punishment of attempt.”).
183
See supra text accompanying notes 103–19.
184
I should make clear that I am not saying that patentees should be automatically held to have
been acting with intent merely because a patent later turns out to be invalid. Rather, I am arguing that
courts should be permitted to make their best guess as to the real patentee intent based on the evidence,
unencumbered by legal fictions. As a commonsensical matter, the fact that a patentee conceals
incriminating evidence would generally make people believe that the patentee knew the importance of
the evidence ahead of time, unless the patentee provided some reason to believe otherwise. What the
Federal Circuit does is use legal doctrine to artificially suppress this commonsensical intuition—it holds
by fiat that the inference of intent cannot be made. See supra text accompanying notes 114–19. It is this
legal fiction that I am criticizing here.
185
See, e.g., Star Scientific, Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 537 F.3d 1357, 1365 (Fed. Cir.
2008) (“The need to strictly enforce the burden of proof and elevated standard of proof in the
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that we want no punishment for minor typographical errors—we optimally
would like a very minor punishment for such a minor mistake. The problem
in current law is not that punishment is applied at all, but only that the
punishment is disproportionate to the offense.
If the punishment is appropriately tailored, however, there is no
theoretical reason not to apply a $1 punishment to a $1 error. Thus, a minor
typographical error by the patentee would attract liability, but the only
consequence would be a $1 fine. The patent would neither be held
unenforceable nor invalidated. There is no injustice in such an outcome.
This theoretical precision runs into a practical problem: It is
administratively difficult for courts to determine the correct amount of the
fine in particular cases,186 and in cases of minor error, it is not worthwhile
to expend these administrative costs to impose a $1 fine. A liability
threshold that categorically exempts minor transgressions will conserve
administrative resources, so that the judicial apparatus is only invoked for
cases that are serious enough to warrant concern.187 Thus, even under my
regime, patentees who make trivial errors like typos will not be penalized
because it would likely cost more for a court to determine the correct
amount of the fine than the fine would be worth.
The administrative cost rationale applies similarly to the problem of
attempts, discussed in Part IV.B.2. “Attempt” means a case where the
patent is in fact valid, and the information suppressed is therefore actually
immaterial, but the patentee believed that the patent was invalid and
intentionally hid information based on that belief. The problem with
attempts is not that the fine will always be small—the fine can be quite
large if the patentee expected a large gain from his fraud (which only
fortuitously failed to materialize). Instead, the problem is that the
administrative cost of determining the fine is particularly high in cases of
attempt because the court is required to discern the patentee’s subjective
anticipated profit from wrongdoing rather than calculate the fine based on a
patentee’s actual profit. A stringent liability rule makes sense in this
context because the high administrative cost will outweigh the deterrence
benefits in all cases except those with the highest anticipated gains from
wrongdoing (G) and probabilities of evasion (pe). This means that a high
liability threshold (which in practice means a high intent threshold since, in
cases of attempt, the suppressed information is by definition immaterial) is
justified for these cases.
inequitable conduct context is paramount because the penalty for inequitable conduct is so
severe . . . .”); Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 873, 876 (Fed. Cir.
1988) (raising the intent requirement in a case involving a clerical error).
186
See infra Part IV.C.1.
187
See Richard A. Posner, Free Speech in an Economic Perspective, 20 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1, 29
(1986) (“The maxim de minimis non curat lex can be given an economic meaning: do not intervene
judicially if the costs of intervention exceed the potential stakes in the dispute.”).
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C. Addressing Objections to the Proposal
In this section, I address some possible objections to my proposal. The
first two objections attack the validity of my solution, and the remaining
four objections are based on pursuing alternative solutions.
1. Courts Lack Information to Calibrate the Penalty.—An
immediate objection is likely to be that courts lack the information to
accurately impose a penalty that exactly matches the culpability in a
particular case. This is true enough. But the information-deficit problem
will plague any solution to the inequitable conduct problem. The relevant
question is not whether my proposal is perfect, but only whether it achieves
better results. And using a flexible penalty to match culpability to
deterrence is better than the regime of current law.
As discussed in Part III, what courts attempt to do now is use the
liability standard as the relevant policy lever to match culpability to
deterrence while imposing a mandatory penalty. This liability-as-policylever approach is both more inherently limited, and more information
intensive, than my proposal. The inherent limitation is that the best result
that can be achieved through calibrating the liability standard is the result
in Figure 5, where there is still suboptimal underdeterrence on the entire
right portion of the diagram. This underdeterrence effect is pernicious
because, at least on the right half of the diagram, the unenforceability
penalty is still upside down: the most culpable cases of misconduct still
receive the least punishment. Over the long term, this perverse result will
inevitably generate criticism and calls for narrowing and abolition.188 In this
sense, reliance on the liability standard as the policy lever, while leaving
the unenforceability penalty untouched, is an unstable equilibrium that is
politically self-defeating.
Moreover, to even achieve the result depicted in Figure 5 by adjusting
liability requires an impossible amount of information and very precise
fine-tuning. What Figure 5 requires is for courts to very accurately assess
the culpability of a particular patentee, and to very carefully calibrate the
probability of finding liability, so that the probability is exactly offset by
the severity of punishment. Because the probability of finding liability is
subsequently multiplied by the severity of the punishment, even minor
errors in the calculation will be magnified, and towards the extreme left the
magnification will be very large. The liability-as-policy-lever approach
thus demands that courts must not make even small errors in fine-tuning
the liability rule, and this requires an enormous amount of information to
make sure the result is precisely correct every time. In comparison, my
proposal for calibrating the penalty is less information intensive and more
tolerant of small errors because errors in assessing the anticipated gain G
(which correlates strongly with culpability) and the probability of evasion
188
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pe are not subsequently magnified. And unlike the inherent defect of the
liability rule approach, there is no reason that a flexible penalty cannot
achieve optimal deterrence in all cases, provided the relevant information
can be collected.
All that said, it is true that collecting the necessary information to
calibrate the penalty will still be costly, and so there will necessarily be
some degree of imprecision and error in a world of limited resources and
finite information. Therefore, in cases where the cost of adjudicating the
penalty (encompassing both the assessment costs and the costs of error)
exceeds the social harms of underdeterrence, it is preferable to impose a
liability threshold and forgive small mistakes on the part of patentees—
thereby avoiding the need to adjudicate a penalty—even with the
understanding that this will induce patentees to take less than the perfect
amount of care.189
2. The Penalty Will Fall on Innocent Assignees.—One concern is
that my proposed punitive fine must necessarily be levied against the patent
owner who brings an infringement lawsuit and is subject to a counterclaim
by the accused infringer; a court generally would not have jurisdiction to
impose fines on nonparties.190 In cases where the patent has been assigned
by the initial patent applicant to an assignee, this means that the fine will be
imposed on an innocent assignee who has done nothing wrong, while the
truly guilty party—the initial patent applicant 191 —will be beyond the
jurisdiction of the court. This would seem to be rather unfair and to negate
the deterrence value of my proposed solution.
There are several responses to this point. The first is that the same
argument applies to existing inequitable conduct doctrine, where the
unenforceability penalty is also applied to the patent owner, who may be an
innocent assignee.192 Thus, in the comparison of whether my proposal is
better than existing law, this criticism is beside the point.193 The underlying

189

This point also answers the potential argument that courts should calibrate both the liability
standard and the penalty to achieve the policy of optimal deterrence. A simple liability threshold is easy
to administer and reduces the administrative cost of calibrating the penalty. Having a very complicated
and finely tuned liability standard, in contrast, would increase the administrative cost with little benefit
because optimal deterrence can be more easily achieved by calibrating the penalty.
190
See Smith v. Bayer Corp., 131 S. Ct. 2368, 2376 (2011) (recognizing a “general rule against
binding nonparties”).
191
Or the prosecuting attorney, who acts on behalf of the patent applicant and whose actions will
therefore be attributable to the principal under standard agency law. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
AGENCY § 7.04, at 171 (2006).
192
See Margo A. Bagley, The New Invention Creation Activity Boundary in Patent Law, 51 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 577, 603 (2009) (“[T]he innocent assignee might just have to suffer.”).
193
Of course, one potential reply is that the unenforceability penalty imposes no punishment on
anyone (in cases where the patent is invalid), so my proposed fine is harsher on assignees. But the
conventional belief is that the unenforceability penalty is an atomic bomb. To now say that the problem
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difficulty is that courts cannot punish nonparties who are outside of their
jurisdiction, and short of creating a qui tam cause of action 194 against
dishonest patent applicants—where any person can affirmatively sue the
patent applicant for the amount of the fine in the district where the patent
applicant resides—this difficulty will remain.
More importantly, the initial imposition of the fine on an innocent
assignee does not mean that the monetary loss will stay on the innocent
party. The assignee will likely now have a breach of contract action against
the initial patent applicant, since one term of the assignment contract—
which can reasonably be implied as a matter of law even if not expressed in
the contract itself—is that the patent being assigned was not dishonestly
obtained.195 The monetary fine levied against the assignee can therefore be
recovered from the initial patent applicant as a consequential loss arising
from this breach. 196 And a court would have proper jurisdiction to
adjudicate a breach of contract lawsuit brought by the assignee against the
initial patent applicant.
Indeed, this type of regime—where an innocent assignee is initially
saddled with a loss so that he will chase down the guilty assignor and
transfer the loss through a breach of contract suit—is quite common in
property law. 197 For example, the innocent purchaser of stolen goods is
nonetheless required to return the goods to the true owner, which saddles
the purchaser with the loss. 198 The rationale for this rule is that the
purchaser will then sue the thief who sold the stolen goods to him.199 This
regime is far better than one where an innocent assignee automatically
became free of all liability,200 since that would induce those who commit

with my proposal is that it is harsher on assignees than the unenforceability penalty would be ironic
indeed.
194
Cf. 35 U.S.C. § 292(b) (2006) (creating a qui tam cause of action against people who falsely
mark their products as patented), repealed by Leahy–Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29,
§ 16(b), 125 Stat. 284, 329 (2011).
195
Cf. Mentor Graphics Corp. v. Quickturn Design Sys., Inc., 150 F.3d 1374, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 1998)
(finding an “implicit representation of validity contained in [every] assignment of a patent”).
196
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 347(b), at 112 (1981) (allowing recovery of
consequential losses).
197
This is implemented by the traditional legal principle that a seller cannot convey better title than
he has. See Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Rethinking the Laws of Good Faith Purchase,
111 COLUM. L. REV. 1332, 1335 (2011) (“Common law and civil code systems all begin with the
fundamental principle that, ordinarily, one cannot convey greater rights than one has—a principle
embodied in the Latin maxim nemo dat quod non habet.”).
198
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 229, at 446 (1965) (making the possessor of stolen
goods liable in conversion).
199
See U.C.C. § 2-312(1) (2012) (creating an implied warranty of good title in every contract for
the sale of goods).
200
Recording statutes, which allow an innocent purchaser to take priority, operate as an exception
from the common law rule. See Robin Paul Malloy & Mark Klapow, Attorney Malpractice for Failure
to Require Fee Owner’s Title Insurance in a Residential Real Estate Transaction, 74 ST. JOHN’S L.
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misconduct to immediately “cleanse” their misconduct by finding a
cooperative buyer who would pay full price for the goods due to the
immunity granted.201
3. Alternative Policing Mechanisms.—My proposal in this Article is
to preserve and improve the inequitable conduct doctrine by implementing
the relatively small fix of replacing the mandatory unenforceability penalty
with a more flexible system of punitive fines. The existing literature, in
contrast, has usually advocated more drastic (and always one-sided)
changes to narrow the doctrine and reduce deterrence.202 The most drastic
narrowing change advocated has been to abolish the inequitable conduct
doctrine altogether. 203 I shall address that suggestion separately in Part
IV.C.5.
The obvious difficulty with narrowing or abolishing the inequitable
conduct doctrine is that it is the primary doctrinal safeguard against
patentee dishonesty.204 As a consequence, critics of the inequitable conduct
doctrine frequently propose placing greater reliance on other policing
mechanisms.205 None of the proposed mechanisms, however, offer adequate
solutions to the problem of patentee dishonesty and underdeterrence seen
on the right side of Figure 1. Because the conventional wisdom has not
appreciated the underdeterrence effect, 206 its proffered solutions do not
adequately address this concern.
The most frequently cited alternative is for the PTO to enforce
disciplinary measures against patent attorneys who engage in misconduct,
under which the PTO can define for itself both the standards for liability
and the appropriate penalty for violation.207 The problem with this approach
is threefold. First, the PTO itself has shown absolutely no interest in
performing this policing function, having unilaterally stopped enforcement
REV. 407, 429 (2000). But recording statutes effectively require purchasers to search title registries and
thus are not blanket immunities for purchasers.
201
See Bagley, supra note 192 (calling this “patent laundering”).
202
See, e.g., Cotropia, supra note 6, at 774–78; Wasserman, supra note 12, at 3 (“[T]his article
advocates limiting the doctrine of inequitable conduct and pursuing alternative avenues for increasing
patent quality.”).
203
See, e.g., NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., supra note 144, at 123 (calling for
abolition); Lynch, supra note 7, at 9 (same).
204
Stijepko Tokic, In re “DDAVP” Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litigation: Is the Second Circuit’s
“Massage” the Way to Relieve the Key Pressure Points Between the Patent System and Antitrust
Laws?, 92 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 536, 539–40 (2010).
205
See, e.g., NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., supra note 144, at 122–23
(arguing that “invalidity, disciplinary action, and reputational concerns” provide alternative
mechanisms of deterring dishonesty); Wasserman, supra note 12, at 3.
206
See supra Part I.F.
207
See, e.g., MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 1, at 1112 (arguing that administrative “agencies are
generally held to be the masters of their own procedures” and “the best punishment might be such
disciplinary sanctions”).
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of existing inequitable conduct doctrine since 1988.208 Second, as the PTO
itself explained to the Federal Circuit in Therasense, it has neither the
institutional capability nor resources to perform such an enforcement
role.209 On resources, the PTO is already “chronically underfunded,”210 and
on institutional capability, it is hobbled by the fact that it cannot issue
subpoenas or compel testimony.211 Moreover, the statute of limitations for
PTO discipline is five years,212 and it would be rare for dishonest conduct to
surface merely one-quarter of the way into a patent’s lifetime.213
Third, the PTO’s enforcement power is limited to disciplining patent
attorneys, not their clients.214 This is often cited as an advantage, in that
dishonest conduct is usually perpetrated by the attorney and not directly by
the client.215 However, such a view is backwards. While it is true enough
that the attorney usually performs the conduct, the benefit and motivation
lie with the client. A client obviously benefits from gaining an invalid
patent that the PTO should have denied and would have denied if the truth
was known. A prosecuting attorney has almost nothing to gain from using
dishonesty to obtain an undeserved patent for his client aside from higher
fees (which the client would be willing to pay only as a function of the
208

See supra Part II.C.2.
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae on Rehearing En Banc in Support of Neither Party
at 15–16, Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (en banc) (No.
2008-1511) (arguing that it is “not possible or practical” to rely on PTO discipline).
210
Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, In Search of Institutional Identity: The Federal Circuit Comes of
Age, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 787, 813 (2008). But see Clarisa Long, The PTO and the Market for
Influence in Patent Law, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1965, 1986 (2009) (arguing that “[t]he PTO’s financial
position [has] steadily improved” since 1994).
211
See 35 U.S.C. § 24 (2006) (limiting the PTO’s subpoena power to contested cases); 37 C.F.R.
§ 11.38 (2012) (stating that a disciplinary proceeding becomes a contested case only after an initial
investigation is concluded). The Federal Circuit recently construed § 24 to cover all proceedings in
which PTO regulations provide that evidence may be taken by deposition. See Abbott Labs. v. Cordis
Corp., No. 2012-1244, 2013 WL 1136627, at *1 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 20, 2013). The PTO’s rules for initial
investigations specify that it may request information from “[a]ny person who may reasonably be
expected to provide information and evidence needed in connection with the grievance or investigation”
but do not specify that this can occur by means of a deposition. 37 C.F.R. § 11.22(f)(1)(iii). Given
Abbott, it is no longer completely clear that the PTO lacks subpoena power during initial investigations,
but I would still regard this as the best reading of existing law.
212
28 U.S.C. § 2462 (time limit for the “enforcement of any civil fine, penalty, or forfeiture”). The
Leahy–Smith America Invents Act extends this to ten years. See Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 3(k), 125 Stat.
284, 291 (2011) (codified at 35 U.S.C.A. § 32 (West Supp. 2013)). This is still only half the time period
during which the misconduct may prove effective.
213
See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (twenty-year patent term); see also Brief for the United States as
Amicus Curiae on Rehearing En Banc in Support of Neither Party, supra note 209, at 15–16 (“[T]he
PTO infrequently learns of the inequitable conduct within [the five-year] time frame . . . .”).
214
See § 32.
215
MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 1, at 1112 (“Inventors and patentees might fairly think that, if
misconduct occurs at the agency, the best punishment might be such disciplinary sanctions (which fall
on the offending attorneys) rather than the sanction of patent unenforceability (which falls primarily on
the patentee).”).
209
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benefit gained). If the point of disciplinary sanctions is to remove the
benefits of misconduct and create deterrence, it makes obvious sense to
impose the sanctions on the client, which the PTO cannot do.
An alternative that does allow imposing sanctions on the client is
criminal prosecution for violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001, which criminalizes
“mak[ing] [a] materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or
representation” to a government agency.216 The problem with this approach
is largely the same as that of relying on PTO discipline. The Department of
Justice has shown even less interest in assuming the enforcement function
than the PTO has. As far as I could determine, the last reported case
involving a § 1001 prosecution for dishonesty to the PTO occurred in
1976,217 and the one before that appears to be from 1934.218 One potential
reason—aside from limited prosecutorial resources—might be that there is
a five-year statute of limitations on § 1001 prosecutions, 219 and, like the
PTO statute, it begins running from the time the offense is committed (i.e.,
not from when the fraud is discovered).220 Because it is unlikely that fraud
on the PTO will be discovered in five years—and patentees can virtually
ensure this by waiting six years before doing anything with their patent221—
there is little credible deterrence from criminal prosecution. To be sure, one
can always argue for extending the statute of limitations—though that
creates many potential side effects, since § 1001 is a general statute
applicable to many government agencies—but even then it is unlikely that
the DOJ will show any inclination to prosecute patent applicants, given
limited prosecutorial resources and the fact that such prosecutions have so
rarely occurred.
A third option that relies on private enforcement (and therefore does
not suffer the problem of lack of inclination and resources by government
agencies), has no statute of limitations issue, and also allows superrestitutionary damages is a private antitrust counterclaim under the doctrine
of Walker Process Equipment, Inc. v. Food Machinery & Chemical
Corp. 222 The Walker Process doctrine holds that a patent plaintiff who
fraudulently obtains an invalid patent and then files an infringement suit
upon it commits an antitrust violation. 223 The standard remedy for an

216

18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2) (2006).
See United States v. Markham, 537 F.2d 187 (5th Cir. 1976).
218
See Meehan v. United States, 70 F.2d 857 (9th Cir. 1934).
219
§ 3282(a).
220
Id. (barring prosecution unless “instituted within five years next after such offense shall have
been committed”).
221
Patentees can wait six years before filing infringement suits without losing any damages. 35
U.S.C. § 286 (2006) (six-year limitation on damages).
222
382 U.S. 172 (1965).
223
See id. at 176–77.
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antitrust violation is treble damages based on the amount of competitive
injury.224
In many ways, therefore, a counterclaim by an accused infringer under
the Walker Process doctrine fits my proposed reform: rather than rendering
the patent unenforceable for the dishonesty, a monetary penalty is imposed.
This penalty is over and above the invalidation of the patent that would
occur anyway (and thereby achieves deterrence). As the doctrine is
currently constituted, however, Walker Process is an inadequate substitute
for the inequitable conduct doctrine for three reasons.
First, courts impose an even higher burden of proof for Walker
Process allegations than for inequitable conduct allegations (if this is even
possible), 225 which makes Walker Process claims basically impossible to
prove and the doctrine a virtual dead letter. 226 One study found that,
between 1985 and 2001, only three Walker Process claims were
successful.227 Even with treble damages, the chance of evasion is so high
that there is likely to be no meaningful deterrence against patentee
dishonesty.
Second, a Walker Process claim requires the accused infringer to
prove other antitrust elements, such as defining the relevant “market” being
monopolized and ultimately the fact of economic monopolization itself
(which a patent does not necessarily establish).228 These antitrust elements
are not relevant to the wrong that inequitable conduct doctrine seeks to
prevent, which is dishonesty to the PTO. Relying on Walker Process as the
primary policing mechanism for fraud on the PTO, therefore, imposes
needless barriers to achieving proper deterrence.
Third, and perhaps most importantly, the Walker Process doctrine can
be easily avoided by a cunning patent applicant who can simply assign the
patent to someone else and thereby “cleanse” the misconduct. 229 This is
because Walker Process requires the plaintiff in litigation to know of the
224

See 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2006).
See, e.g., Dippin’ Dots, Inc. v. Mosey, 476 F.3d 1337, 1346–47 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“To demonstrate
Walker Process fraud, a claimant must make higher threshold showings of both materiality and intent
than are required to show inequitable conduct.”).
226
Blair Silver, Controlling Patent Trolling with Civil RICO, 11 YALE J.L. & TECH. 70, 94 (2009);
see 1 HERBERT HOVENKAMP ET AL., IP AND ANTITRUST § 11.2(f), at 11-25 (2d ed. Supp. 2011)
(“Walker Process claims are usually not successful.”); David R. Steinman & Danielle S. Fitzpatrick,
Antitrust Counterclaims in Patent Infringement Cases: A Guide to Walker Process and Sham-Litigation
Claims, 10 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 95, 99 (2001) (“Walker Process claims [are] . . . extremely difficult
to plead and prove . . . .”).
227
See Steinman & Fitzpatrick, supra note 226, at 99 n.22.
228
See Walker Process, 382 U.S. at 177–78 (“Without a definition of [the relevant] market there is
no way to measure Food Machinery’s ability to lessen or destroy competition.”); see also Ill. Tool
Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006) (holding that a patent does not establish market
power for antitrust purposes).
229
See Bagley, supra note 192 (calling this “patent laundering”).
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invalidity of the patent and its fraudulent history.230 As described in Part
IV.C.2, allowing assignees to take a patent unencumbered by the assignor’s
fraud opens an enormous loophole because the guilty assignor ultimately
benefits through the ability to charge a higher price in the transfer.
Of course, the Walker Process doctrine can be modified to remedy all
of these defects, though it would probably require a Supreme Court
decision to do so. But at that point we are merely talking about the
doctrinal label under which my proposed reform would be implemented,
not its substance. Whether my proposal is implemented under the heading
of a “modified Walker Process doctrine” or a “modified inequitable
conduct doctrine” really does not matter. What matters is that there is a
doctrine that imposes a more than restitutionary remedy (i.e., real
punishment) whenever patent applicants commit highly culpable fraud in
the PTO. My suggestion is to impose punitive fines under the inequitable
conduct doctrine, but the same substantive effect can be achieved under
other doctrinal labels.
4. Attorney-Fee Awards as a Punitive Remedy.—Another potential
objection to my analysis is that current law already permits an additional
monetary enforcement mechanism, namely the possibility of awarding
attorneys’ fees to accused infringers. A judgment of inequitable conduct
allows, but does not require, an award of attorneys’ fees in favor of the
accused infringer.231 Since this award of attorneys’ fees creates an effect
over and above simply forfeiting the patent, it provides additional
deterrence that mitigates the underdeterrence effect. The prospect of
receiving attorneys’ fees also provides some incentive for accused
infringers to pursue inequitable conduct arguments even in cases where the
patent is invalid.
While the potential for attorneys’ fees ameliorates the underdeterrence
problems I have identified to some extent, it is clearly inadequate, at least
under current practice. First, the chance of receiving an attorneys’ fee
award is miniscule: the chance of winning an inequitable conduct defense
is already very small (because the burden of proof is so high),232 and courts
usually deny attorneys’ fees even when inequitable conduct is proven.233 In
these circumstances, it would make little sense for an accused infringer to
investigate and litigate an inequitable conduct issue solely for the prospect
of an attorneys’ fee award: the additional costs of investigation and
litigation must be expended upfront, while the chance of recapturing them
is remote.
230

See Walker Process, 382 U.S. at 177 n.5.
See Gardco Mfg., Inc. v. Herst Lighting Co., 820 F.2d 1209, 1215 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
232
Petherbridge et al., supra note 16, at 1308–10.
233
Nolan-Stevaux, supra note 85, at 168 (noting that even when inequitable conduct is proven,
courts awarded attorneys’ fees only 40% of the time over the last ten years).
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Second, the amount of attorneys’ fees that can possibly be awarded is
inherently less than the value of a fraudulently obtained patent because it
would never make sense to spend more in attorneys’ fees than the value of
the patent at stake. Combining the low probability of attorneys’ fee awards
with their inherently limited value means that no patentee is ever likely to
be deterred from dishonest behavior due to the availability of this sanction.
As even the courts have long recognized, attorneys’ fees are “of secondary
importance” in the inequitable conduct calculus,234 and without a stronger
penalty, “the relationship of confidence and trust between applicants and
the Patent Office [would not] have any real meaning.”235 While courts are
mistaken in believing that the unenforceability remedy provides a stronger
penalty that deters serious patentee misconduct, the belief that attorneys’
fees are inadequate is quite correct.
Of course, courts can change their doctrine to make attorney fee
sanctions easier to impose. And if attorneys’ fees were regularly imposed,
the prospect of such fees may be enough to induce at least some accused
infringers to continue pursuing an inequitable conduct claim even when the
unenforceability penalty is superfluous due to the invalidity of the patent.
Even then, however, relying on attorneys’ fees as the primary remedy
would be problematic because attorneys’ fees will always be less than the
value of the patent, and in the very worst cases of misconduct such a cap
would be too low to provide adequate deterrence.236 In short, while attorney
fee sanctions can work as a complement to my proposed system of punitive
fines, they cannot be a full substitute and thus cannot save the existing
system.
5. Abolish the Duty of Candid Disclosure Instead.—The most
extreme alternative solution that is usually suggested is to abolish the
inequitable conduct doctrine entirely.237 This has the obvious problem that
inequitable conduct is the primary—indeed, for all practical purposes, the
only—enforcement mechanism to ensure patentee honesty in dealings with
the patent office.238 To abolish inequitable conduct, therefore, would leave
234

See Norton v. Curtiss, 433 F.2d 779, 795 & n.14. (C.C.P.A. 1970).
Id. at 795.
236
To be sure, at the extremes, this problem also affects my proposal. Namely, the proper fine for a
privately valuable but fraudulently obtained patent (e.g., a patent on a blockbuster drug) would be so
high that a court would likely recoil at the “sticker shock,” and in any case, a fine that is so high that it
drives the patentee past the point of insolvency has no additional deterrence effect because the patentee
is then judgment proof. See S. Shavell, The Judgment Proof Problem, 6 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 45
(1986); see also U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5E1.2(a) (2012) (providing for waiver of
fine if defendant is unable to pay). But at least the implicit “cap” is much higher under my proposal
than one where the amount of punitive fines is capped by attorneys’ fees expended.
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See, e.g., NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., supra note 144, at 121–23 (calling
for abolition); Lynch, supra note 7, at 9 (same).
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See Dolak, supra note 17, at 17–22 (arguing that alternative proposals are unsatisfactory); see
also supra Part IV.C.3.
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no enforcement mechanism for the duty of candor (also known as the duty
of disclosure).239
One response to this is that we should abolish the duty of disclosure as
well.240 The argument is usually framed by noting that the United States is
the only country with a duty of disclosure, but our patent system is not of a
noticeably higher quality than those of other countries. 241 I have two
responses to this argument.
The first is that it is not quite true. A duty of disclosure is inherent in
every patent system242 because a core part of the patent bargain is honest
disclosure of the invention.243 Without a duty of disclosure and a policing
mechanism to ensure honesty, a patent applicant could fabricate an
invention by, for instance, conjuring out of thin air clinical trial results
showing a cure for AIDS and then wielding any patent obtained to terrorize
competitors, all without penalty even if the applicant is caught. 244 Thus,
every patent system has a duty of honest disclosure and requires a
mechanism to enforce honest disclosure to the patent office. Other
countries generally have less onerous requirements of disclosure, 245 and
they enforce the requirement using different policing mechanisms such as

239

See 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a) (2012) (“Each individual associated with the filing and prosecution of a
patent application has a duty of candor and good faith in dealing with the Office, which includes a duty
to disclose to the Office all information known to that individual to be material to patentability . . . .”);
see also id. § 1.105(a)(1) (allowing the PTO to demand disclosure of additional information beyond that
required to be automatically disclosed under § 1.56).
240
See, e.g., Jay Erstling, Patent Law and the Duty of Candor: Rethinking the Limits of Disclosure,
44 CREIGHTON L. REV. 329, 365 (2011) (recommending either “abolishing the duty of candor
altogether” or at least limiting it such that “no duty of disclosure would be imposed on an applicant
unless an examiner determined that information was needed but the examiner was unable to access it
herself”).
241
See id. at 346–47 (“T]he duty of disclosure is not only failing to achieve its objective of
providing more comprehensive patent examination, but also is contributing to poorer quality [compared
to other countries] . . . .”).
242
At a minimum, every country requires filing a patent application, which inherently requires
disclosing information. See, e.g., Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, supra note
52, art. 4 (establishing system of patent application filing); European Patent Convention art. 83, Oct. 5,
1973, 1065 U.N.T.S. 199 [hereinafter European Patent Convention] (“The European patent application
must disclose the invention in a manner sufficiently clear and complete for it to be carried out by a
person skilled in the art.”).
243
See J. E. M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 142 (2001) (“The
disclosure required by the Patent Act is ‘the quid pro quo of the right to exclude.’” (quoting Kewanee
Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 484 (1974))).
244
Cf. Advanced Magnetic Closures, Inc. v. Rome Fastener Corp., 607 F.3d 817, 830 (Fed. Cir.
2010) (patent applicant fabricating evidence of inventorship).
245
See, e.g., European Patent Convention, supra note 242, art. 124 (allowing the European Patent
Office to demand applicants provide information on prior art but not requiring automatic disclosure as
the United States does).
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patent office discipline or perjury prosecutions,246 but every patent system
inherently requires some amount of disclosure from patent applicants.
The second point that follows is that the question is not whether there
should be a duty of disclosure but only the scope of that duty and the
policing mechanism used to enforce it. The scope of the duty of disclosure
is a worthwhile question, 247 but it is tangential to the argument of this
Article on improving the inequitable conduct doctrine. As long as some
duty of disclosure exists, there will be a corresponding need for a punitive
remedy for its breach, and my argument in this Article is that inequitable
conduct is the best doctrinal mechanism by which this can be
implemented.248 This is not to say that current inequitable conduct doctrine
performs this function well—it doesn’t, as Figure 1 shows—but only that
inequitable conduct is the best mechanism available. It can be reformed to
achieve the desired result with only slight doctrinal adjustments.
6. Reducing the Penalty for Invalidity Instead.—Finally, an
alternative worth discussing is the possibility of reducing the penalty for
invalidity instead. That is, the problem I identify comes from the overlap
between the remedy for invalidity and the remedy for dishonest behavior.
In theory we could solve this overlap either by imposing additional
penalties for dishonest behavior (as I have proposed) or by reducing the
penalties for invalidity; both would create a marginal difference. 249 And
though reducing the penalty for invalidity might be counterintuitive at
first—to my knowledge it has not been proposed in the academic
literature—it finds some support in historical practice.250
Until the Supreme Court’s 1971 decision in Blonder-Tongue
Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation, 251 a judgment of
invalidity did not invalidate the patent but only provided a personal
defense. A patent that was held invalid in one case could still be asserted
and enforced in future cases. 252 The only way to truly “invalidate” a
patent—to permanently revoke it—was to obtain a writ of scire facias,
246

See, e.g., Patents Act, 1977, c. 37, § 92(5) (U.K.) (making perjury penalties applicable to
proceedings in the European Patent Office).
247
On this question, I am inclined to agree with Thomas Cotter’s formulation that the ultimate
objective is to induce applicant disclosure “only if it is less costly for the applicant to disclose the
information than it would be for the examiner to find it herself,” and even then only if the disclosure is
net socially beneficial. Cotter, supra note 62, at 752–53.
248
See supra Part IV.C.3.
249
This is the mirror reflection of the observation in equal protection jurisprudence that we can
achieve parity by “level[ing] up” or “level[ing] down.” See Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection,
124 HARV. L. REV. 747, 787 (2011). We can also achieve disparity by going up or down.
250
See John F. Duffy & Mark A. Lemley, Why Do Juries Decide if Patents Are Valid? 2 (2012),
available at https://www.law.uh.edu/wipip2012/Abstracts/LemleyAbstract_wipip2012.pdf (discussing
historical practice).
251
402 U.S. 313 (1971).
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See Triplett v. Lowell, 297 U.S. 638, 645 (1936).
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which required proof of fraud. 253 This regime provided some deterrence
against dishonest behavior because dishonesty could result in permanent
revocation while invalidity would merely result in a one-off judgment.
Although overruling Blonder-Tongue and returning to the traditional
regime might provide a means for deterring patentee dishonesty, it would
create other problems.254 Namely, it would result in many patents covering
old, useless, and obvious inventions staying on the books even after their
invalidity has been discovered and proven, so long as the patentees
engaged in no misconduct. Given the widespread concern over the
prevalence of undeserved monopolies impeding commerce and
innovation255—a concern that remains even if patentees do not intentionally
obtain fraudulent patents—it is unlikely that the benefits of this solution
would outweigh the costs.
CONCLUSION
Three propositions dominate the conventional wisdom on inequitable
conduct. The first proposition is that the unenforceability penalty is always
a draconian “atomic bomb.”256 The second proposition is that inequitable
conduct is frequently alleged but rarely successful in litigation and that this
implies the allegations are generally unmeritorious and patentees are almost
never truly dishonest.257 The third proposition is that the proper solution
involves changing the liability threshold so that overdeterrence should be
met by narrowing liability, 258 while underdeterrence should be met by
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See Mowry v. Whitney, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 434, 440 (1871) (noting that a writ of scire facias to
revoke a patent could issue only in cases of conflicting patents or for fraud). Additionally, the writ of
scire facias could only be obtained by the government, so the PTO could not hand over enforcement to
private parties. Notably, the PTO did not stop enforcement of inequitable conduct until 1988. See supra
text accompanying note 123.
254
See Joseph Scott Miller, Building a Better Bounty: Litigation-Stage Rewards for Defeating
Patents, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 667, 687–88 (2004) (“We . . . should not solve the free rider problem
that Blonder-Tongue creates simply by reinstating Triplett.”).
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See, e.g., Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 670 (1969) (“[There is an] important public
interest in permitting full and free competition in the use of ideas which are in reality a part of the
public domain.”); see also JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES,
BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 8–11 (2008) (arguing that too many patents
impede innovation); FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 73, exec. summ., at 5.
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Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1288–89 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (en
banc).
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See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Dayco Corp., 849 F.2d 1418, 1422 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (allegations
are “an absolute plague” because accused infringers “get anywhere with the accusation in but a small
percentage of the cases”).
258
See, e.g., Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1290 (tightening the intent and materiality elements); Star
Scientific, Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 537 F.3d 1357, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (raising pleading
standards).
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expanding liability. 259 As this Article has demonstrated, each of these
propositions is wrong.
Contrary to the conventional wisdom, the unenforceability penalty is
not always a draconian atomic bomb. While it is true enough that the
penalty is very harsh when applied to minor errors, it is equally true that the
penalty is practically nonexistent in cases of serious patentee fraud, where
unenforceability is redundant with invalidity. Thus, at the same time it
generates too much deterrence against minor errors, the unenforceability
penalty also creates insufficient deterrence against the very worst types of
patentee misconduct. The conventional wisdom that focuses only on
preventing overdeterrence, and not underdeterrence, thus misses half the
equation.
Similarly, although inequitable conduct allegations are rarely
successfully litigated, this fact does not prove that the allegations are
unmeritorious or that patentees are rarely seriously dishonest. Rather, the
low win rate is virtually certain to occur given accused infringers’ upsidedown incentives to litigate. Judges will rarely see the very worst types of
misconduct litigated as inequitable conduct cases because in those cases
accused infringers will choose to devote their resources to a defense of
invalidity that is far easier to prove and almost equally rewarding. The false
inference that is normally drawn from low success rates in litigation—that
this means that the allegations are generally frivolous and that patentees are
generally honest—in turn prompts judges to narrow the inequitable conduct
doctrine. This perpetuates a vicious cycle, since the narrowing of
inequitable conduct doctrine makes the defense even less appealing to
accused infringers in litigation and means that even fewer meritorious cases
will be brought to the judges’ attention. This vicious cycle continues even
when the underlying empirical assumption (that patentees rarely or never
engage in serious misconduct in the PTO) has no valid foundation.
Once the nature of this upside-down-incentive effect is understood, it
also becomes clear that changing the liability standard will not solve the
fundamental problem. Neither narrowing liability nor expanding liability
will achieve good outcomes. As seen in Figure 2, narrowing liability can
reduce or even eliminate the overdeterrence problem, but only at the cost of
maintaining or even exacerbating the underdeterrence problem.
Conversely, as seen in Figure 3, expanding liability will not meaningfully
resolve the underdeterrence problem, but can significantly exacerbate the
overdeterrence problem. In all cases, a significant underdeterrence problem
will remain if reform is focused on the liability standard. The conventional
focus on liability standards, therefore, is another reflection of the fact that
the underdeterrence side of the equation has been overlooked.
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See Norton v. Curtiss, 433 F.2d 779, 795 (C.C.P.A. 1970) (advocating a lower materiality
standard to prevent underdeterrence).

1304

107:1243 (2013)

The Upside-Down Inequitable Conduct Defense

Rather than modifying the liability standard, a more fruitful avenue for
reform would be to focus on calibrating the penalty to match punishment to
culpability. Because the unenforceability penalty in fact achieves the very
opposite of the desired effect, it should be abolished. In its place, a system
of punitive fines that are calculated according to my proposed formula can
achieve better outcomes, with less information cost, than a system based on
modifying the inequitable conduct liability rule and preserving the
unenforceability remedy.
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